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7 MARCH 1990

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# ***JPRS Report***

# **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

### Romanian Salvation Front Vice Chairman on Minority Affairs

25000601G Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
10 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Kiraly Karoly, vice chairman of the Romanian National Salvation Front Council, by Jozsef Gyorgy Farkas: "By All Means I Want To Take Part in Putting the Country Back on Its Feet"; date and place not given; all place names in Hungarian as published]

[Text] [NEPSZABADSAG] When were you last in Hungary and what is the purpose of your visit to Budapest?

[Kiraly] I last visited Hungary in 1977 as a private citizen on a vacation exchange at Lake Balaton. I was head of a group in one of the small industrial cooperatives. This was the last time—13 years ago, but I will admit that even before that I visited Hungary only a few times. I really do not know the country, because I have seen virtually nothing aside from the Balaton and Budapest. As for my present trip: This is not a visit. I came here to obtain medical treatment. I am ill, unfortunately. For the past two months I have been tormented by neuralgia; I must have it cured quickly and effectively. Effectively, because I am taking a lot of medicine, and this may cause more trouble. And quickly because work is awaiting me at home. There is an awful lot to be done after the revolution, both in Bucharest and in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu-Mures]. And by all means I want to take part in this tough battle, in putting the country back on its feet, in making the revolution victorious.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is your function in the Council of the National Salvation Front?

[Kiraly] In addition to being vice chairman, I manage the Nationality Commission which functions within the Front, i.e. a working group that deals with nationality issues. But the position statement which appeared last Friday concerning nationality rights in Romania was developed primarily by the group headed by Geza Domokos. At that time I was in the countryside, in Marosvasarhely and in Szekler country [ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania] and thus the bulk of the work was performed by them. I, we gave our approval afterward, of course—all of us from the Council. This is how the position statement came about. In my view it was received very well by the entire Romanian population. This is the first time in the lives of members of minorities of Romanian citizenship—and thus also of Hungarians, that a statement like this, a proclamation like this, has been issued, one which contains their requests, their requirements, their wishes. This document has very great significance, and although it is not perfect it holds out much promise.

[NEPSZABADSAG] At one time you served as Kovaszna [Covasna] County first secretary; accordingly you were active in the party. At this time the Romanian

Communist Party has disintegrated. What perspective do you envision in the country?

[Kiraly] Before anything else let me say that I regard myself as a party outsider, i.e. I do not regard myself as a member of the Romanian Communist Party. I would have resigned my membership a long time ago had certain circumstances permitted that. I would not regard belonging to another organization or association as compatible with my present office of being vice chairman. And as far as the future is concerned—this is very hard to tell. In my view, the Romanian Communist Party has fully compromised itself, and to my knowledge no one is making any effort to reorganize it. Such efforts would be difficult under the present circumstances, because ill feelings about anything tied to Ceausescu's name are so great. Certainly some advocates of leftist ideals remain, but the cleansing process will take time. At the same time, one can see that after years of dictatorship, freed from the terrible oppression, people are driven by some kind of never before seen, euphoric desire to act. Everyone is bubbling, talking, making and debating suggestions, and researching new solutions that may be applied in the new situation. Quite naturally, council members of the National Salvation Front are no exceptions; we are also trying to find the most suitable path toward democratic evolution. And yet, five days after the revolution achieved victory they struck our heads with criticism: Why is there no change yet, why are we not speeding ahead the way we would like to?! At that time I told the members of one of these groups: Even God took six days to create the world, and it would not have done any harm if he had perfected it for another two weeks....

### Minority Leader in Czechoslovakia Appeals to Havel

90EC0235A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
3 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Cultural-Social Association of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia Chairman Zoltan Sido, by Tibor Kis in Prague, January 1990: "The Era of Collective Suppression Must Be Condemned"; first and last paragraphs are NEPSZABADSAG remarks]

[Text] Last Friday, on the day that Vaclav Havel was elected president, Zoltan Sido, the president of CSE-MADOK [the Cultural Association of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia], presented a letter on behalf of his organization to Marian Calfa, the head of the federal government. Our Prague correspondent asked Zoltan Sido: "What message does the Hungarian cultural organization of Slovakia have for the Prime Minister?"

[Sido] The letter's contents are no secret: In the interim it was published by the UJ SZO of Bratislava. It was written primarily because we feel that the past is still with us, and it is our moral duty to put a suitable end to one of the saddest chapters in the history of our ethnic group, the years during which many of us were expelled, deported, and collectively deprived of our rights.

## POLITICAL

Accordingly, one of the fundamental purposes we had for writing the letter was to morally condemn point No. 8 in the so-called Kassa [Kosice] governmental program—that is, the passage that proclaims the principle of collective guilt—as well as to abrogate all regulations that detrimentally discriminate against national minorities. We are also proposing that the government create a Hungarian-Czechoslovak joint committee to scientifically study the history of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and Slovaks in Hungary between 1945 and 1949. We feel that the results of this study should be published simultaneously in both countries, so that the sense of history survived jointly by our peoples will be absorbed into their consciousness. We feel that there should be modifications made in the teaching of our shared history, and that history books also need to be revised, so that they promote trust and mutual rapprochement between nations and national minorities. By the way, this is not the first time we have made proposals of this nature to the authorities: In the past, however, our efforts in this regard have not been publicized and did not bring substantive results. We hope that, in view of the new circumstances, the head of the government will soon react to our proposals.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As long as we are talking about new circumstances, it appears that the role of the CSEMADOK is also changing. There have been reports that several parties are being organized among the Hungarians of Slovakia. Does not the CSEMADOK also plan to become a party?

[Sido] As of now, we feel that the role of the organization is to participate in political life by representing our interests in social spheres. Of course, we may change our view in the future. For example, it is not clear who will be eligible to be nominated in the coming free elections. If only parties can make nominations, then we will have to weigh what we should do in that situation. But such decisions can only be made by the congress [of the CSEMADOK] which will meet in March.

[NEPSZABADSAG] We have heard that, in addition to Deputy Prime Minister Sandor Varga, the new Slovak Government will have deputy ministers of Hungarian ethnic background. When can we expect to see these appointments?

[Sido] Next week. By the way, we have made personnel recommendations concerning each of the ministries. We have recommended the writer Lajos Grendel to be deputy minister of cultural affairs; the candidate Janos Szolgai to be deputy minister of forestry and water management; Jozsef Kvarda, an associate of the government's ethnicity committee, and the journalist Richard Pomichal to be deputy minister of interior and environmental affairs; Laszlo Nagy, an associate of Bratislava Educational Prognosticating Institute, to be deputy minister of education; Laszlo Nagy, the president of the Aranyos Cooperative in the Csallókőz region, and Maria

Viragh, an associate of the Agricultural and Food Industry Labor Union, to be deputy minister of agriculture.

Interviews with Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel have been published in the Slovak-language publication VEREJNOST and in issue number 4 of Bratislava's NAP. In the interview, the concept of creating a federal-level Ministry of Ethnic Affairs was also mentioned. In his response, Havel emphasized that he is confident that such a ministry will soon become reality. In his view, this could come about through the work of a governmental committee, in which each of Czechoslovakia's nationalities and ethnic groups will be represented.

## BULGARIA

### Alia Linked to Hoxha's Widow

90EB0209B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian  
21 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] Ramiz Alia and Nedzmija Hoxha became acquainted in the youth antifascist movement back during the war (the Albanian Communist Youth Alliance). Nedzmija, who was the older and more influential, took note of his talent and, according to certain sources, was herself the one who recommended him to Enver Hoxha. Their contacts have continued since that time, both in politics and in private life, all the way to a family connection, since Alia's daughter married Nedzmija's son.

Alia was always said to be a man in whom Enver placed exceptional trust, he was his right-hand man in framing policy as the party ideologue, he helped to write speeches, but he was always servile, following him everywhere like a shadow. In the assessment of observers, he simply knew how to be assertive enough to deserve his place, but not so overassertive as to suffer in the purges like many others of Enver's comrades-in-arms.

The relation was reinforced by the marriage of their children. For Alia, Enver was the sovereign chief whom he respected both as a soldier and as a politician, and the fact that he was quite a bit younger also made their relationship easier.

Alia was born in Skadar in a poor Muslim family which had moved there from Kosovo during World War I. He completed elementary school in Skadar and then the academic high school in Tirana, where he was an excellent student. He speaks French, Italian, and Russian, and in 1957 he graduated from the party school in the USSR. He is short in stature, balding, and he has always had the reputation of an intellectual in the party leadership. He is lively, but not overassertive; and his physiognomy suggests a depth of mind. He moved up the ranks rapidly both as a soldier and then as an officer and politician.

He is intelligent and crafty, but he is not a leader and resolute creator like Enver Hoxha. It is evident from

what he has done in these several years without Enver that he does not have much range as a reformer either.

His advantage in the present leadership is that he did not directly dirty his hands in the purges, but it is beyond dispute that he himself had to have taken part in the settlement of accounts. Nor should we overlook the fact that his wife comes from a prestigious family of Orthodox faith and is the daughter of the well-known albanologist Aleksandar Cuvani. He gave Nedzmiha Hoxha the post of president of the Democratic Front—which is something like our Socialist Alliance, but she did not get a place in the party Politburo, which is persuasive indication that her influence is of limited range after all.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Strougal on Past, Present

90EC0272A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech  
16 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with the former Premier Lubomir Strougal by CTK correspondents J. Tomes and R. Prorok: "What Does L. Strougal Think?"; date and place not given; first paragraph is SVOBODNE SLOVO introduction]

[Text] CTK [Czechoslovak Press Agency] correspondents J. Tomes and R. Prorok visited the L. Strougal, the former premier of the federal government, in his cottage in the Jizerske Mountains. They interviewed him for more than two hours.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] In the past twenty years you were to some extent a co-creator of our country's history. That period is now being very critically reappraised. What is your opinion about that?

[Strougal] That particular period cannot be assessed in any other way but critically. The initial promises—that the ideas of the CPCZ Action Program of April 1968 would remain in force even after the invasion by the Soviet armies—had not been kept. The party's leadership used to argue about it quite often in the 1969-71 period, and two opposing camps appeared on the scene. Unfortunately, the progressive one did not prevail. Instead of ideas of democratic socialism, the neo-Stalinist model was adopted. The fundamental reasons for the failures of past years stem from the political system, that is, from the authoritarian enforcement of the CPCZ's leading role.

When I became premier of the CSSR in 1970, we tried, albeit to a very limited extent, to continue certain economic reforms. The government was not in charge of the Ministry of the Interior, of the Foreign Ministry, and of the Ministry of National Defense; although constitutionally we should have had authority over them, the actual power was in the hands of the CPCZ.

At certain times we did try to reintroduce the economic reform. However, we realized that economic progress is

essentially contingent on political reforms. The most promising period began after the ascendancy of M. Gorbachev. Unfortunately, even at that juncture, when our leadership was forced to adopt certain ideas of economic and partly also of political reforms, the majority of the party's leaders obviously would not take those reforms seriously. For that reason, at that time we again had to make serious compromises with the economic reform which our new government of national understanding is now proceeding to correct, I think, in the right direction.

Essentially nothing at all has been done with the political reform. I could see that a number of comrades in our party's leadership were not really convinced about democratization. For that reason, in the fall of 1988 I requested to be relieved of my office in the government. I continued to serve as a deputy of the Federal Assembly and as a member of the CPCZ Central Committee. At a meeting of the CPCZ Central Committee on 24 November 1989 I learned that most of the members of the Central Committee were incapable of responding to the developments following 17 November. At that time I decided to resign from the CPCZ Central Committee and also, to give up the office of deputy.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] From your answer it follows that the government was subordinated to the CPCZ Central Committee. Was it the same before 1968?

[Strougal] Yes, indeed, but then we had some dialogue going on; it concerned ecological and social issues, the constitutional rights of the members of the government were respected. After 1972, the interference by the CPCZ Central Committee in the affairs of the government intensified. Nevertheless, I would be telling a lie if I said that, as the premier, I lacked space for dealing with socio-economic issues, although I always had to submit pertinent proposals to party authorities.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] What is your opinion about the screening of the party membership after 1968?

[Strougal] I thought that democratic interviews should be conducted. Please understand, after such serious events some people might have expressed the view that they did not wish to be party members. I did not advocate the mass purges which took place according to the following equation: "Do you approve of the entry of the armed forces? Do you disapprove of the entry of the armed forces?" That resulted in the removal of a number of reformists with a great intellectual potential, which considerably weakened the reformist trend in the party.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] Permit us one more question about the events on 17 November. According to some views, the attack was pre-planned with the intention of breaking down the power of the leadership at that time. What do you think about it?

[Strougal] I believe that this is pure speculation. Police interventions were the consequences of the system of

power and of policies based on the premise that demonstrations are not expressions of popular discontent but anti-socialist manifestations, and that most people support the CPCZ.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] What is your estimation of the changes underway in our society?

[Strougal] These changes can speed up the development of our country under one condition: that national understanding is seen as a categorical imperative, and thus, that it must be our goal, no matter what conflicts we may have to face. President Havel is a thousand times right when he calls for tolerance. I think that the current process offers good opportunities to activate our nation.

\* \* \*

L. Strougal denied the information given to the CTK by the Czech Hunting Association that he used to participate frequently in game shooting parties. All he attended were official dinners at hunting parties for diplomats. About his private life he revealed that he is married and has a grown daughter, a son and five grandchildren; his hobbies include skiing and in the summer, tennis. He owns a family residence in Prague, a cottage in Jizerske Mountains, and a cabin in south Bohemia. He and his wife each own a car. Furthermore, he indicated that he might write his memoirs.

To the concluding question how he assesses his career, he replied: "With great disappointment. Things should have been done differently over the past 40 years. The errors began as far back as 1948 when the rule of a single party began." It is the opinion of our editorial board that L. Strougal himself contributed his undeniable share to those errors.

### Biographies of New Slovak Ministers

90EC0274A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak  
12 Jan 90 p 2

[Short biographies, source not given, of Vladimir Meciar, Doctor of Law, SSR Minister of The Interior and Environment; Stanislav Novak, Doctor of Medicine, candidate for doctor of science, SSR Minister of Health and Social Affairs; Silvester Minarovic, Doctor of Law, Minister and chairman of SSR People's Control Commission; and Tibor Bohm, Doctor of Law, new SSR Prosecutor General]

[Text]

### New Members of SSR Government

**Vladimir Meciar, Doctor of Law, SSR Minister of The Interior and Environment**

No political affiliation. Born 26 July 1942 in Zvolen. After finishing high school in 1959 worked as an official of the local management division of the District National Committee [ONV] in Ziar nad Hronom. After completing basic military service he held various posts

with the youth union at the district level, eventually serving on the Slovak central committee. Started as staffer of district committee. Elected secretary and, in 1967-68, chairman of the Czechoslovak Youth Union District Committee. In 1966 he was also foreman of youth construction in Kolarov. In 1967-68 he was vice chairman of the People's Control Commission attached to the District National Committee in Ziar nad Hronom. At national youth congress in 1969 he delivered a speech with new, progressive ideas, for which he was relieved of his youth league duties and thrown out of the CPCZ in 1970. That same year he began work as an assistant furnace operator at the Heavy Engineering Plant in Dubnica nad Vahom, where he worked until 1973. Because of an ongoing interest in the law, in addition to his job he graduated from the Komensky University Law School in Bratislava. In 1973 he began work as an official at the Sklo-Obal plant in Nemsova, soon thereafter becoming the company lawyer.

**Stanislav Novak, Doctor of medicine, candidate for doctor of science, SSR Minister of Health and Social Affairs**

Member of Democratic Party. Born 3 June 1941 in Topolcany. After completing his studies at the Komensky University Medical School in Bratislava he began work as a professional assistant at the Institute of Pathological Anatomy at the Komensky University Medical School in Bratislava. Since 1969 he has worked at the Tuberculosis and Lung Disease Clinic, first as a professional assistant, and since 1978 as the head physician of Division IV of the hospital of the Lehnice Institute of Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases in Podunajske Biskupice. Along with his professional work he received a certificate in pathological anatomy in 1968, a level I certificate in internal medicine in 1971, and an advanced certificate in tuberculosis and lung diseases in 1973. In 1978 he defended his doctoral candidate thesis at the medical school in Magdeburg. He is the author of numerous professional articles. Since 1986 he has been a delegate from the Ward National Committee in Bratislava I. At a special congress of the Democratic Party in December 1989 he was elected to membership in the Central Committee Presidium of the Democratic Party. He is also a member of the Democratic Party Executive Committee.

**Silvester Minarovic, Doctor of Law, Minister and chairman of SSR People's Control Commission**

Member of the Freedom Party. Born 31 December 1937 in Vinicnom in the Bratislava-Suburb region. After completing a railways apprenticeship program he began working in 1954 as an electrical installer, and soon thereafter as a lighting technician in the Czechoslovak Film studios in Bratislava. After completing evening studies at the Electrical Engineering Technical School he became director of professional training at the Railways Professional Training Center. Since 1975 he has worked as senior power engineer at the enterprise directorate of Czechoslovak Automotive Transport [CSAD] in Bratislava, then at the Trnava OPKS [expansion unknown]. In

addition to his jobs he also graduated from the Komensky University Law School in Bratislava. After holding several posts in the Freedom Party, he became central secretary of the Freedom Party on 8 December 1989. He has been a member of both the regional and district committees of the National Front. Since 1982 he has been a delegate to the Slovak National Council. He has worked in the Slovak National Council committees for trade, services, and transportation, as well as being chairman of the SNR [Slovak National Council] Institutional Legal Committee.

#### New SSR Prosecutor General

##### Tibor Bohm, Doctor of Law

Born 15 March 1930 in Kremnice. After completing high school he began to study at the legal department of the former Slovak University in Bratislava. In 1950 he was thrown out of the department during a political purge. Thirteen years later he was able to resume his studies at the Komensky University Law School in Bratislava. In the interim he worked in various organizations as a lawyer. Since 1970 he has worked as an attorney. He has worked consistently and tirelessly as a defense attorney in political disputes. In particular he has defended citizens who have been persecuted and prosecuted for manifesting their religious beliefs. He has been an attorney in Bratislava. He has never been active politically, and is not active politically now.

#### Civic Forum's Leaders on Its Prospects

90EC0232A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech  
12 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with P. Pithart and P. Kucera by A. Slezakova; date and place not given; first paragraph is LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE introduction]

[Text] The Assembly of the Civic Forum's Coordination Center [KC OF] met last Saturday [6 Jan]. Among other things it approved the composition of a 30-member council of the KC OF and nominated Petr Pithart, Petr Kucera and Ivan M. Havel as its representatives. We met with P. Pithart and P. Kucera to prepare the following interview for LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE readers.

[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE] What do you regard as the most important tasks and most serious problems of the Civic Forum [OF] at the present time?

[Pithart] Considering the most immediate task, we want to propose in the shortest time possible an election system acceptable to the significant political forces in the country, a system that would guarantee that the call for free elections which was so often heard during the demonstrations of our citizens will be heeded. This is a system which would open up room for political pluralism. I say open up because we cannot do more than that. The newly emerging political parties are small and will remain so for some time; clearly they will not be able

to establish their profile and develop prior to the elections to the extent that would already assure a functioning pluralism. So it is really only the elections which should create room for pluralism. And the composition of the representative body emanating from them should also provide a guarantee that the trend is irreversible, which is a requirement we regard as fundamental in the election system. Recently an American political scientist addressed me urgently on the Forum's steps, saying roughly the following: "You are now the decisive political force and I hope you will set up an election system best suited to you so that you will win really big." I looked at him with incomprehension because none of us think that way. We do not want to continue after the elections as a party; perhaps the Forum may remain after them in some form but certainly not the present one. We do not want to replace one dominant political force with another, and so we will not construct the election system to suit us and only us. Let me emphasize once more: the election system should open up room for political pluralism and guarantee that this room will never again be diminished, curtailed. Thus it will offer an opportunity to all who are not beholden to the old order. Of course this does not mean that it will make it impossible for the Communist Party to exist as one of the political parties.

[Kucera] I want to emphasize that we want to preserve the profile of the Civic Forum as a political movement.

[Pithart] A political movement proceeding from the fact that there will be for a long time and perhaps always in our country a number of engaged nonparty people who will not want to join any party but still wish to be active as citizens. We will offer them a candidate slate and thus for now we will conduct ourselves as a political party even though we are not and will not be one. Moreover, we accept under our umbrella the small emerging political parties if they so wish. They too will then show up on the Civic Forum's candidate slate.

[Kucera] I am increasingly coming to the conclusion that the decisive partial goal is not the election itself but rather the formation of a strong post-election government coalition. Only such a coalition will be capable of shouldering responsibility for the many unpopular measures which must follow to change our society and state from backwardness to a society and state on the European level. This will require a strong executive power.

[Pithart] By the executive power we mean the government and by a strong coalition we mean such parliamentary support of the government which will permit it to take the necessary (and there probably will be many) unpopular measures. If we had a parliament with one or two deputies from each tiny party, it would not be capable of supporting the government.

[Kucera] According to our data there are presently no fewer than 36 political parties and miniparties applying for registration...

[LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE] Do you envision the requirement that a political party must obtain a certain percentage of the vote in the election to be represented in the parliament?

[Pithart] Yes, we envision this restrictive clause.

[Kucera] We have already reached a basic agreement in the roundtable negotiations that this clause should be included in the election law.

[Pithart] I'd like to take advantage of this interview to make another point. Civic forums are active also at workplaces. There they should see to it that there is change, in the most democratic form possible, in the workers council where it exists and in the trade union organization, but should abstain from interfering with operational problems. We have reports that in some places the forums, if I may say so, are causing holy terror. And this causes us a big worry: we believe that we have helped people to stop being afraid of the Communist Party, but we do not want to see it happen that people must be afraid of us. But we have no power to issue any orders to civic forums in workplaces because we are not a party with a vertical hierarchy. We have no democratic centralism, so we occasionally take a trip to some place and try to calm the situation, but this may not be enough. So I am using this platform to address the civic forums at workplaces asking that they do not behave as the Communists used to. That, after a change in the structure of the trade union or workers council, they begin to pull back. If we do not want to have CPCZ organizations at workplaces, we shouldn't ultimately have forums there either. A different situation exists in the localities—towns and villages, where the forums will of course be active at least until the elections.

[LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE] How do you evaluate the present cooperation between the Civic Forum and the Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL] and how do you think it could be improved?

[Pithart] From the very first days of the Civic Forum's existence the cooperation has been very intensive—there were days when we met with CSL representatives even more than once. But this involved only coordination because no serious problem or misunderstanding ever arose between us. We consulted over certain positions, harmonized them—and there were complex issues such as those concerning the reconstruction of the Czech and Federal Governments: the Civic Forum supported CSL members as candidates for important ministerial posts such as Dr. Richard Sacher for the CSSR Minister of the Interior. It may be hard to believe, but I cannot find anything to suggest for improvement in our cooperation. In our view it is at the optimum. And now, when before the elections all will increasingly follow their own lines and the CSL faces the voters as an independent political party, we still reckon on giving support to the CSL not only as a whole but also to certain People's Party personalities in some form, for instance through the media. This may well be an atypical "pre-election"

conduct on our part, but we are not a political party and hence we not only can but also want to do so. Personally we believe that this will apply not only to the CSL but also the other political parties—why should we be prevented from expressing our opinion that some Communists may deserve more trust from their voters than others? Cooperation or coordination with the People's Party seems to me most likely and most promising.

[Kucera] We appreciate very highly the role played by the CSL until the time when our first deputies joined in parliamentary work. Until that time People's Party deputies communicated and put forward also our own proposals and so the cooperation in this area too was very good. And we believe that in the pre-election campaign as well as after the elections we will find ways to proceed jointly and work to assure that our society will become truly democratic.

### Programs of Agrarian Parties Discussed

*90EC0269A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech  
27 Jan 90 p 6*

[Article by T. Somol: "In the Spirit of Agrarianism"]

[Text] Readers are becoming increasingly interested in the activities of political parties with agricultural interests. This is clear from the numerous letters that have arrived at the editorial offices. The question is frequently raised of how these parties are alike and how they are different. The same topic was recently the theme of a roundtable discussion sponsored by Czechoslovak Radio on Monday. Our radio colleagues allowed us to be present. We took advantage of this opportunity, and this article contains the most interesting parts of the discussion.

Representatives from three parties accepted the invitation to attend. Docent Eng. F. Trnka, chairman of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party and his colleague Dr. J. Styk represented the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party; M. Vanura represented the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party of Towns and Villages; and V. Hlavko and Eng. A. Ryba represented the Free Farmer's Party.

V. Hlavko took the floor in response to the question of the differences among the political programs of the parties. He stated that "At first glance it would appear that our programs are in agreement. However, reading them more closely shows that this is not the case. To be sure, all of us recommend different management systems. The fact of the matter is, though, that our rural citizens have the right, or will assert for themselves the right to work the land as they see fit. This means choosing between cooperative and private ownership, between stock ownership and renting. The main point of our program is that the ownership of forest and agricultural land, and of bodies of water, is inviolate. The same is true for ownership of the means of production."

Eng. Ryba said, "My view is that we cannot only look back. We have to start with the existing structure.

However, we need to generate competition within whatever management structures we choose, to support a market economy. Only later will we determine the form or forms of ownership that are the most viable."

M. Vanura: "In contrast, our program provides much more support for private management. We will request compensation for property nationalized under Law 123/75, which relates to fields, farm buildings, machinery, etc. Our program differs in that it accords greater respect to religion. And finally our program is concerned with the social sphere. We contend that farmers who have been discriminated against by the tax system or by age restrictions, should be treated the same way as employees of the socialist economy. For example, they should not have to retire when they are 55. At our request the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is already looking into this."

"We place the most emphasis on input from below. Our goal is to create a rich, high quality rural life", added Docent Trnka. "We can accomplish this only when we begin with the status quo and analyze worldwide developments. We need to learn about the agricultural systems of countries that have not undergone forced collectivization. Based on this analysis we can recommend, offer to farmers alternative development paths. I think that the future lies in the coexistence of different forms of ownership and of firms of different sizes. Elsewhere in the world mammoth firms live quite well next to smaller operations."

"The possibility of private ownership appears in the platforms of all three parties," M. Vanura comments. "However right now we have not one, but many private farmers who need support and encouragement following a period of pressure of various kinds that was brought to bear on them masterfully by the ruling class of that time."

V. Hlavko: "Our party is being joined by many people interested in private ownership, including young people. For instance, 500 young people have joined recently from the Ostrava region alone. For these private farmers to be truly equal participants I think some state subsidies will be necessary because these farmers often inherit decrepit buildings and broken down machinery."

"We, of course, will take steps to right the wrongs committed against former private farmers, the unnecessary nationalization, forced resettlement, low wages, etc." adds Docent Trnka. "At the same time we need to acknowledge the current situation. Currently, 60 percent of our agriculture is accounted for by large firms which, even though they were formed improperly, are going concerns. It would not be good for the national economy if we were to attempt to break them up rapidly. Of course, a market mechanism will result in completely different business relationships. If cooperatives and state farms do not adapt, they will fail of their own accord. Clearly, though, the future does not lie solely in small private farms."

V. Hlavko: "Our opinion is that small family farms will be able to react immediately to certain business conditions. The previous joining of smaller farms into large units inevitably involved joining stronger operations to weaker ones. The result was mediocrity. This is why there is currently pressure in the villages to break up the very large enterprises. The principle for this breakup is one village—one cooperative, with each village then having the right to decide how to manage its cooperative."

All three parties expressed support for the heritage of Antonin Svehla and the agrarian movement. As Dr. Stych stated, "the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was fond of organization in the pre-war period. Mainly in the sense that the farmers were organized into interest groups, such as hop farmers, horse breeders, beekeepers, grain farmers, etc. The party served merely as an umbrella organization. Its purpose was not to attend meetings to raise hands. Each group took care of its own business, and in this sense they were agrarians. The party also supported small monetary institutions that helped farmers through hard times. We would also like to adopt the idea of direct links between the processing industry and the primary producers who delivered their products to the processing plants."

Eng. Ryba also agreed that it is time to stop criticizing Czech, Moravian, and Slovak blue collar workers of the First Republic. "When we look at the history of the agrarian movement there is nothing there that we would reject out of hand. If there were mistakes made they were political mistakes, mistakes of individuals. The decision of other political parties not to allow this party to reconstitute itself after the war had clear political overtones. All the other parties, after all, were trying to win the voters that had voted for that party before the war. The proof is fairly clear, I think that our farmers behaved very well during the occupation, bravely resisting the occupying forces."

#### People's Party Rejects Accusation of Complicity

90EC0289A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech  
2 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Dr. Bohumil Svoboda, first vice chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party: "What the Party Was, What It Is, And What It Is Not"]

[Text] Occasionally we hear the public view that over the past forty-odd years the Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL] compromised itself by collaborating with the Communist regime. Therefore, this view calls for a frank and definite response.

After the events of February 1948—whose anniversary we shall soon remember, this time without fireworks and fanfare—the CSL, as our entire society, gradually found itself under the absolute control of the communist party which, however, needed the CSL as well as the other political parties in order to pretend to the world public that there exists the so-called socialist democracy. Of

course, the communist could not expect any cooperation from the legitimate leaders [of the CSL] and therefore, it got rid of them and replaced them with new ones. At that time thousands of our members were sent to prisons or concentration camps; many underwent torture and frequent beatings in prisons. The party had hardly pulled itself together after having its ranks decimated by the Nazis, and again it lost even more martyrs. Thousands of their families were broken up or discriminated against. Into our party's leadership the ruling power installed individuals whom it correctly expected to serve as its obedient tools. Those stories are notorious. Yet our membership base survived; it was scarcely breathing, but it was alive.

Let us now ask: who in fact constituted the party over this long period of forty years? Could it be kept alive by the imposed, corrupt and mostly reprobate individuals on its top? Or did it survive because of the party's shackled but still living membership base? After all, the party was not composed of the few people on the top, but of the people who formed it—its membership base constantly nurtured by its Christian and democratic ideals which burst into flame again and again, like hot embers covered by ashes when a gentle breeze begins to blow. Whenever these little flames appeared on the surface, they had to be suppressed, stifled and doused. For that reason, we used to say for years that our membership base was good, but the leadership was too much; one of our former chairmen used to say with disgust that the best party would be one that could fit all in a bus.

Without the controversy of which I speak, how could we explain why the reform movement has found such great support among most of our party members, which scored such notable and absolute success when an auspicious occasion appeared.

Naturally, there is no need to deny that in our party—as well as in our entire society—we still have plenty of individuals who think along the old lines, or rather, who prefer the old situation where someone else used to think and decide for them; in some cases, those individuals hold high offices. T. G. Masaryk used to say that it hurts to think. Moreover, it also hurts to get moving, particularly when it leads to anything new, untested and unfamiliar. Of course, it will take us some time to replace those sluggish cadres; that is a process which could not, and cannot be, resolved by our gentle revolution in one stroke.

The party is the membership base and not a crowd of people who have risen to the top because they contradicted Christian and democratic principles and ideals. The membership base found its expression in the reform movement; it owes no apologies to anyone—contrary to what some people occasionally urge us to do. It committed no crimes and transgressions, discriminations and repressions, nor had it distorted and falsified the truth, and departed from Christian and democratic values. This is the real party which last November made

a resolute break with the echelon of indecent persons, as President Vaclav Havel said so well, and which has returned to the legacy of its founder, Jan Sramek. The old leadership was in power until the end of November of the past year but, of course, long before it had introduced in our party anti-democratic and anti-Christian practices, persecuted people instead of engaging in a dialogue with them, closed and blocked the few available avenues instead of opening new ones, suppressed every reference to Christianity and religion, and promoted unmitigated atheism; now it is turning to a new, and we are convinced, a better road.

It is now two months since the new leadership has been at work. That is not a very long time for political action, yet it permits some review. Meanwhile, we presented ample evidence that this is no “return to the old pork barrel,” as some wag characterized the radical change in our party. All one has to do is to take a look at the change in our party's status in our representative bodies, the Federal Assembly, in the Czech National Council and in the government, and at the change of the coverage in our press, and to compare it with the not so distant past. The Biblical dictum, “By their deeds you shall know them,” will certainly suffice for such comparisons.

## HUNGARY

### Sociologists Comment on Meaning of Being Lefist 25000598B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Jan 90 p 17

[Interviews with Ivan Vitanyi, Gyula Hernadi, Elemer Hankiss, Gyorgy Konrad, and Mihaly Sukosd, in Budapest on 5 January, by Gyozo Daniss: “The Healthy and Unhealthy Features of Being a Leftist”; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Eighteen years ago five members of the intelligentsia who were engaged in the humanities and inclined to conduct political discourse, but who themselves did not make a living from politics, began to discuss the meaning of being a leftist. They were not the only ones to do this, but they were considered to be among those who felt the greatest responsibility in this regard. The increasingly accelerating events prompted these men at this time to review all the changing and unchanging features of this particularly important concept of our century. Anyone who accepted the New March Front's invitation to Corvin Square last night could learn about the views held by these five persons. The night before the event we were able to interview all five of them.

### Ivan Vitanyi: It Was Compromised Even Without Quotation Marks

[Vitanyi] It has been almost two decades since the five of us—old friends—gathered. We wanted to prepare a sociological literary analysis. In the course of our meeting one of us used the term “leftist persuasion.” We conversed for hours, from that point on. We all agreed

that the Stalinist concept of leftist persuasion—the practice designated since then by the dual concept of party-state/state-party—should be rejected, and that it must not be regarded as being of a leftist character. On the other hand, we were also aware of the fact that as a result of mistakes and crimes committed by Stalinism, one's leftist persuasion—without quotations marks—has been compromised in the eyes of a substantial part of society. It has become compromised just like quite a few other concepts, including socialism. And the process has not been disrupted ever since. Perhaps the concept of democracy constitutes the only exception; it has retained its clearly positive content. I would add here: In those days we pondered how much of our youth's ideals we could realize. Today we ponder the extent to which old ideas are valid, and to what extent they may be accepted.

[NEPSZABADSAG] And what is your finding?

[Vitanyi] Generalities must be avoided in regard to the concept of leftist persuasion. We understood leftist persuasion to mean liberty, equality, and solidarity. And that is also our understanding today. The three attributes simultaneously; all three, as they apply to the economic, domestic, and foreign policy. We professed, and continue to profess, that there can be no left which does not guarantee universal suffrage by secret ballot, a real opportunity to make a choice.

[NEPSZABADSAG] These attributes of leftist persuasion appear to be acceptable to everyone, save one or two existing parties, or the people in some party factions. But if that is the case, it hardly makes sense to use this concept....

[Vitanyi] In all probability it is true that the more developed the economy of a society, the better the left and right scheme will apply to its political structure. The same is true in reverse. The more backward—these days we use the term "peripheral"—a society is, the less we can talk about a real left or right. For example, in the Soviet Union, Stalin's and Brezhnev's system called itself left-wing, while it was very, very far from the enumerated attributes of leftist persuasion.

But here I must add something: Changes in the recent past that have taken place in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe once again provide a chance for the real left not to be ashamed of leftist persuasion, despite the fact that the past constitutes a heavy burden, and despite the fact that in many countries of the world forces which may be termed "conservative" are advancing.

[NEPSZABADSAG] To what extent could we talk about a left-wing and a right-wing in the Hungary of the 1990's?

[Vitanyi] These are months in which things have not yet evolved. This applies both to the parties, and to left-wing values. We cannot accurately tell how, and along what interests society is divided. It is for this reason that the parties are unable to develop crystal clear platforms. The best of left-wing values almost transcend the lines of

force of the evolving party structure. It will probably take a few years before we know to what ideals people have committed themselves.

I believe that taken together, the most recent changes are favorable. Even if there are some who regard these changes as left-wing, and others who view these as not left-wing changes. Together with my friends I recognize in these changes the advancement of left-wing values the way we understand them to be, even though the five of us pursue five different kinds of lifestyles, and even though there are among us members of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and the New March Front.

#### Gyula Hernadi: The Right Became Worse

[Hernadi] Once upon a time the right was good and the left was bad, because people shook hands with their right hands and wiped their bottoms with their left; and because the aristocracy sat to the right of the king, and the bourgeois which later stood up against him, sat to his left. And even later the working class considered itself to be part of the left.

Leftist persuasion is actually an intellectual form of conduct, of course. Accordingly, there are no left-wing parties or parties that belong to some other side. Instead there is a left within parties—even the Nazi party had a left-wing! Right-wing and left-wing attributes are mixed even in individuals. But such individuals must speak out if it appears that within their parties views which conflict with the individual's views appear to be gaining the upper hand. Being truly on the left always represents universal values in contrast to partial values promoted by the right.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What universal values are we talking about?

[Hernadi] I accept Leszek Kolakowski's concept of leftist persuasion: Being on the left represents a denial of social prerogatives. It stands up against colonialism, the fact that one nation exploits another, and correspondingly condemns the events that took place during the "heyday" of CEMA. A person on the left promotes the freedom of speech and the press; is tolerant—even though it always remains a big question where to draw the line in regard to tolerance, because could the left tolerate the fact that the right prevails over the left?; denies the sacred nature of any dogma; accepts violence—if dictatorship cannot be prevented otherwise; believes in the mutability of human personality—the fact that a person could really change from being a conservative even into a reformer; and leans toward compromise—but recognizes that the outcome is a compromise and does not want to elevate that compromise to the heavens.

[NEPSZABADSAG] If we accept these features as being those of the left, we find that no small portion of the past several decades' attributes have been not left-wing, but right-wing.

[Hernadi] True. This then presents the odd situation in which people who want to delimit themselves from Stalinism announce themselves to be right-wingers. And for good reason: because Stalinism proclaimed itself to be left-wing while in reality it was right-wing. For this reason anyone today can recruit a following with right-wing watchwords, or with watchwords that sound right-wing.

Nevertheless, one must be very careful in judging these things—see what was said about tolerance. One ponders, for example why so many left-wing values were accepted by both Christianity and the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. Just as one ponders why some people regard themselves as politicians—authentic, well-prepared politicians—because at one time—before or after 1956—they suffered indignities. The truth is that not even the longest prison term will create a man worthy of a role in public life if he is dumb.

#### **Elemer Hankiss: Extremist Interpretations**

[Hankiss] Leftist persuasion is one of those concepts whose meaning is subject to the most extreme changes, not only in politics, but also in the economy and with regards to most aspects of social life. Leftist persuasion meant something different in old England and France, and something else in Poland or Hungary. And quite naturally it was and is confronted everywhere with a different kind of right, and center.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What do "left" and "right" mean today in Hungary?

[Hankiss] This question is difficult to answer because the SZDSZ, which originally espoused social-democratic ideals and declared itself to be liberal, has shifted in a liberal-conservative direction nowadays, but it does not regard itself as a right-wing organization. And they are correct in this regard, at least in Hungary, because these days, let's say in Western Europe, a liberalism of this kind would hardly be perceived as left-wing. But there are quite a few other examples.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The public regards the MSZP, the MSZMP, and the Social Democratic Party [SZDP] as being farthest to the left. Is the "man on the street" correct in this assessment?

[Hankiss] This depends on the vantage point from which we view these parties and programs. In very many countries the left-wing legacy is anticapitalist. Traditionally, left-wing parties stood up against the excesses of market economies. They are attracted by a more planned economy, one that regards the collective interest as particularly important. Viewed from this vantage point these parties are certainly left-wing parties. At the same time, however, the SZDP is in coalition with the SZDSZ, the party which advocates radical privatization and private property, and which for this reason would be placed in the right-hand field of the political spectrum in a Western European democracy. At the same time,

however, the SZDSZ is also a left-wing organization because it advocates constitutional liberty and radical liberalism.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly there is no "right" and "left."

[Hankiss] I would not say that! But it is true that as of today in Hungary the use of either of these concepts is unfortunate. Because both have meant many things already! And because either or both have been regarded as having a positive as well as a negative content. The appropriate term would be "neutral," but it appears that the time for that has not yet arrived. In reality there are many ways for advancement. One or the other can be proven only by the future. It is only in the future that we will be able to say which party did most in the interest of achieving what we have accomplished thus far.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Considering the various values represented by the parties, could we put together some "dream organization"?

[Hankiss] Parties are at their ideal best if there are several of them! I am not aware of any party, all of whose actions were beneficial when it was acting on its own. After all, there are very many different interests in society. There is no party, movement, or group which can express and serve all of these interests. I believe that given time three or four parties may evolve in Hungary which can struggle against, and cooperate with each other.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How long would this take?

[Hankiss] We may take the first step in this direction in the elections scheduled for next spring. But only the first step! This is because during the remaining few months today's parties would be hardly capable of accurately defining themselves. For this reason the electorate is also unable to make a real choice. Therefore, I have more confidence in the subsequent election. It is likely that we will not even have to wait five years until that election.

#### **Gyorgy Konrad: Liberal Democracy**

[Konrad] I believe that in Hungary we must suspend the use of the concepts of leftist and rightist persuasion for a while, because during the past decade both acquired the greatest variety of connotations.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Let's stick to the concept of leftist persuasion!

[Konrad] In the course of our history the left has asserted radical and liberal demands for a long time: a parliamentary democracy, universal, equal and secret suffrage, agricultural reform, and so on. Subsequently, in 1919 proletarian dictatorship became attached to the left, and in the aftermath of 1945 the bolshevist ideal of the state, which had a terror apparatus on the left mainly in the Soviet Union, just as Hitler's Germany had a terror apparatus on the right. In addition, the left always stressed some universal human values, namely the idea

that one should rise above partial interests, and that one must think in terms of humanity as a whole.

[NEPSZABADSAG] To what extent was the post-1945 Hungarian left responsive to these general criteria?

[Konrad] I do not believe that the turnaround of 1948-49 was leftist in the latter sense of that term. It was much rather reactionary; it rendered free political movement impossible. Actually it recreated the structure of the orders; the party headquarters and the executive secretary were surrounded by a courtly milieu. This, at a time when the party secretary regarded himself as left-wing and progressive. He did so, even after it became obvious that the country was travelling in the wrong direction. Well, the constraint of self-justification was too strong!

State censorship forced critical voices underground, and such voices tried to find an outlet among other things in the uncensored, free press, the samizdat. This was not a brand new phenomenon. Kossuth and Széchenyi were forced to do the same vis-a-vis the Habsburg autocracy. They were liberals, as compared to the emperor.

[NEPSZABADSAG] They were liberals as compared to a government that regarded itself as not of the leftist persuasion. In our day and age, however, both the government and the ruling party have proclaimed themselves to be of the leftist persuasion. And both their supporters and their opponents profess to believe in left-wing values....

[Konrad] One tried to legitimize an existing practice by using this term, while the opposition tried to protect the personal freedom of citizens with this word. The concept of leftist persuasion has so many meanings, that we should not use it for a while. And I am not the only one who thinks this way. We should use expressions which have an accurate, definite meaning instead.

I would, of course, not rule out the possibility that the terms "left-wing" and "right-wing" would regain their legitimate meaning in a constitutional, liberal democracy which evolves in the meantime. In this case these terms would mean a division between those who agree that a parliamentary democracy must be maintained.

One thing is certain. There are two fundamental values: autonomy and solidarity. In liberal democracies these values can be agreed upon jointly by left-wing movements. We must also know that liberals both on the left and the right are each other's mutual allies with respect to any unconstitutional, forceful, conspiratorial action, irrespective of whether such action is taken by the left or the right. In this regard respect for "the rules of competition"—political sportsmanship—is most important. And these terms will regain their true meaning and dignity once that happens.

#### Mihaly Sukosd: Thus Far It Has Been Missing From Our History!

[Sukosd] Leftist persuasion is simultaneously a relative and an absolute concept. It is relative because it is always

to the left of something or someone. In this case there is naturally a right and some kind of center. Although in absolute terms, between the two world wars neither Count Istvan Bethlen or Count Pal Teleki could be regarded as leftists, they were by all means left-wing prime ministers as compared to Bela Imredy. And the left is absolute to the extent that it casts its votes for eternal and universal values.

[NEPSZABADSAG] For example...

[Sukosd] Let's start at the beginning. The fountain source of modern left-wing thought is England and France. Toward the end of the 17th Century it changed England from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy. The French Revolution of 1789, which is better known in Hungary, but which in my view has a more dangerous legacy from the standpoint of modern leftist ideals, later on changed the French monarchy into a modern, democratic republic. My ideal of the left includes both the French revolutionary watchword of liberty, equality, and solidarity that sent the ruler of the French people to the scaffold, and the British act which got rid of the ruler in the same way by placing Parliament above the will of the king.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Still today, a live tree is nourished by both roots. But in our history we would be looking in vain to find an exact copy of the British or the French revolution. What roots could nourish the Hungarian left?

[Sukosd] In Hungary it is not only that a left-wing ideal along the British or the French pattern did not come about, our conceptions of the left also differ from the traditions of nearby countries. The 1867 Compromise created an ambiguous capitalism and a welfare state consistent with then prevailing concepts. And yet, a host of brilliant minds regarded this system as harmful—including Gyula Székely and László Nemeth! They claimed that supporters of the Compromise advocated an imported Hungarian liberalism, and that all of this eliminated the opportunity for real Hungarians to govern the country. This approach greatly damaged the Hungarian left—let's think of World War I, the revolutions of 1918 and 1919, and Trianon.

Another catastrophe occurred after 1945. Let me give you just one example. Dezső Sulyok, whose name is mentioned with increasing frequency nowadays, and whom I happened to know in my childhood, defended and rescued Jews in his capacity as a lawyer practicing in Pápa during the horrible year of 1944. During the war he was strongly opposed to the Germans and he actively participated in the prosecution of war criminals. Despite all of this, he was regarded a right-winger during the presumably most beautiful flowering of the coalition era, and his party was slanderously called a fascist party. Later on the totalitarian system which called itself left-wing expanded its power even more. Stalin's world of the Gulag differed from Hitler's Auschwitz only to the extent that it called itself leftist. Based on all of the above I am not amazed that the youngest generation of the

intelligentsia regards and proclaims itself to be not only anticommunists, but that they generally stand up against the left. In other words, I can understand them, but I do not agree with them. Because I regard myself as a person of leftist persuasion, even if I do not regard myself as a communist or a Marxist.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What kind of leftist are you?

[Sukosd] One who delimits himself from extremes. On the one hand, I delimit myself from the practices of the old MSZMP, and from what the new MSZMP intends to pursue, insofar as I have become aware of these. On the other hand, I delimit myself from regarding Mindszenty as the symbol for Hungarian progression, despite the fact that he was tortured and convicted in the course of a conceptual trial, etc, because he was not a progressive personality, a politician.

[NEPSZABADSAG] And what does your left-wing inclination accept?

[Sukosd] My ideal of the left is one which has never before existed in Hungary. It is a way of thinking that is free from bondage and prejudice, one that does not contrast the individual and the collective. It is a way of thinking which holds as one of its important theses that the community must concern itself with poverty as long as poor people exist. A way of thinking in which the ideal, the goal, is the achievement of a parliamentary democracy. All of this requires an economy that performs better than it does today, of course, an economy, in the development of which the left must play an indispensable role amid the present, relatively favorable conditions.

#### **Press Law: Implications of Defamation of Character Amendments**

*25000609A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 20 Jan 90 pp 72-73*

[Article by Endre Babus: "Proposal for Penalties Payable by the Press: by the State, Vaguely"]

[Text] For appearances' sake, it looks as if the government would want to "harness" the press by virtue of a proposal prepared for the January session of Parliament concerning special penalties payable by the press. As perceived, however, the amount of penalties collected would not be paid to the person defamed by one or another press report, but to the state itself.

Special penalties of up to 500,000 forints payable by press organs may be assessed in the future by civil courts, if Parliament approves a related government proposal at its session beginning on Tuesday (23 January). As planned, a suit demanding that a newspaper publish a corrected statement may give rise to the assessment of the fine, just as the violation of a person's personal rights would, such as printing a person's photograph in the newspaper without that person's permission. Thus far this sanction was unknown in Hungarian law governing

the press. Its introduction is urged by the Ministry of Justice on grounds that in this way courts may express society's disapproval of offensive editorial offices more emphatically by ordering the payment of "fines as a secondary penalty". The nine paragraph proposal intended as an amendment to the press law reveals that the fines thus collected would be paid to county councils, which in turn would be obligated to spend those amounts for public purposes.

It is an undeniable fact that during the past decades it was not always possible in Hungary to receive satisfaction for defamatory writings published by the press, just as it was not possible to obtain a remedy for defamation caused by one private person to another. The possible criminal liability of a slanderous, libelous, or perhaps "blackmailing" journalist gave little satisfaction to the defamed person, and the situation is essentially the same in regard to corrections made by the press concerning untrue statements it published. On the other hand, defamation by way of, e.g., a slanderous article did not result in damage awards during the past decades according to Hungarian law. This is so because provisions authorizing financial compensation in such cases were deleted from Hungarian law in 1953. This kind of recompense was narrowly restored once again in 1978—e.g., a financial award may be made for an accident resulting in loss of limb—but disadvantages suffered by a person as a result of a defamatory article did not result in the financial compensation for the victim, just as there was no financial compensation for slapping a person in the face in public. (HVG 24 September 1983).

Undoubtedly, the fact that the conditions of the Hungarian press are becoming normalized, and the fact that the critical tone of newspapers is on the increase, would warrant the establishment of a legal obligation for mass communication organs to once again compensate persons whom they defamed in a manner contrary to law. This could be accomplished in a manner similar to the provisions of the press law of 1914. The penalty now planned, however, does not recognize and offset a wrong suffered by a defamed person, but would presumably serve only to "harness" the press. This suggests that for some mysterious reason and for the time being the government is cautious about recognizing wrongs suffered as a result of defamation of character, as contrasted to material damages. At the same time, the "harnessing" of the press is recommended by an increasing number of political forces—and not only by political parties. It is apparent that the Ministry of Justice gave in to that pressure when it recently and surprisingly came up with the idea of introducing fines to be levied against the press in the public interest. In addition to the fact that the proposed measure does not stay within the realm of giving general recognition to the defamation of character concept, this special form of sanctioning of offenses committed by the press raises some serious concerns.

Above all, it is hard to explain why the state should lay claim to damage awards made in civil proceedings for untrue, illegal publications rather than paying the award

to the defamed person who initiated the proceeding. This solution is hauntingly reminiscent of the Hungarian legal institution of a dubious character called "conviction in favor of the state," on the basis of which landlords charging usurious leasing fees were not obligated to refund the illegally collected funds to the lessor who suffered the damage, but to the state.

However indifferent the possible introduction of fines payable by the press may be to defamed persons, it is understandably more sensitive from the standpoint of convicted editorial offices. Despite this and the cavalier definition of the fines payable—they could amount to anything between zero and 500,000 forints—there is no guarantee whatsoever that media enjoying an approximately similar situation would be assessed at least identical sized penalties in various regions of the country for the same or similar offenses. It would take time to develop a uniform sentencing practice, while admittedly, the public interest fines levied against the press are regarded as a temporary legal institution. It may be reassuring from the standpoint of the Justice Ministry's preparedness to be self-critical, but independent from this, the heavy fines may be unfair in the upcoming months to editorial offices which happen to be fined.

Finally, one must have reservations about the possibility that this sanction could be applied also to cases involving corrections published by the press. Namely, suits of this nature essentially involve summary, accelerated proceedings, during most of which there is no time for anything else than to weigh the evidence presented by the parties at the hearing. Damages up to a half a million forints appear as too heavy to be awarded without any protection during a proceeding like this.

Incidentally, the present hurried proposal for the establishment of a press court is closely related to one of the severe failings of last summer's political negotiations between those in power and the opposition. Namely, from among the six pivotal issues before the "national triangle," the parties to the negotiations resolved only five: The sixth, the legislative proposal for the new press law was not even prepared. In this way the Ministry of Justice obtained a free hand to quickly develop sanctions meant to harness the press, which in the end it was able to resolve only along the pattern of "the state doing justice," based on old reflexes.

#### Rift Between 'Independent,' 'National' Smallholders Explained

National Smallholders Press Briefing  
25000598C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
6 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] Members of the operative body of the National Smallholders and Bourgeois Party [NKP] formed a few weeks ago in Szeged held an introductory press briefing on Friday. According to reports, the new party regards itself as the heir to the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], established in 1930 and reorganized in 1945. It

rejects having any common ground with the party that existed after September 1947. For the first, and as they stressed, the last time they presented to journalists the reasons for their split from the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], and then went on to describe the basic principles of their program. The program will be finalized next week and will be presented to the full steering committee on 20 January.

Dr. Imre Boross, head of the provisional operative committee stated that sharp differences of opinion within the FKGP were already evident last September. In his capacity as chief legal counsel for the party, Boross made several unsuccessful verbal and written attempts to restore party unity. The main reason for the NKP's split from the FKGP is that bolshevik political practices became the rule within the FKGP: They oppressed the minority, and did not tolerate opposing views, factions, and openness. In reality, the leadership of the earlier party did not perform its work appropriately, did not provide a program, and did not deal with organizations in the countryside.

In addressing economic issues, Boross said that the NKP intends primarily to protect the interests of entrepreneurs, including the peasantry.

Responding to questions, NKP leaders told the press that a number of people had joined the NKP already. Thus, for example, 80 percent of the Csongrad County Smallholders, half of the Bacs-Kiskun County membership, all of Nograd County's members, and three-fourths of the Szabolcs County membership have joined, together with several organizations in the countryside, including in Baranya, Pest, and Veszprem counties. More than half of the Budapest membership joined the NKP.

Boross made clear that all relationships between the FKGP and NKP leadership ceased, even though Boross believes that the future calls for unification or at least a party alliance. The NKP is prepared to conduct proper negotiations, Boross said.

#### Independent Smallholders Response

25000598C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
6 Jan 90 p 5

[Interview with Istvan Prepeliczay, Independent Smallholders Party executive secretary, by P.L., date and place not given]

[Text] We asked FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party] Executive Secretary Istvan Prepeliczay what he thought of the Szeged party establishment.

[Prepeliczay] The FKGP leadership is pleased that this handful of mostly left-wing persons, who had been attempting to disintegrate the party for a long time, has left the party. Now that they have left, the FKGP leadership will be able to enforce its will without having to deal with self-serving arguments. I wish to stress that no party rift has taken place, because the Szeged creature

was established by persons excluded or suspended earlier by the party leadership, or by persons left out from county leadership posts after having failed to win reelection. They are now making an attempt to expropriate the name and program of the Smallholders Party whose members number 40,000.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What future relationship do you contemplate with the NKP [National Smallholders and Bourgeois Party]?

[Prepeliczay] We have terminated all contacts. The FKGPs leadership will not enter into any debate with those who tried to disintegrate the party; at the same time, however, we are looking forward to the return of party members who have been mislead.

### **FKGP Rejects Alliances**

*25000598C Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
6 Jan 90 p 5*

[Text] An FKGPs [Independent Smallholders Party] Political Committee position paper states that the party will not form an alliance or coalition with the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], or with any party or social organization before or after the elections. The position paper also underscores the party's demand to restore 1947 land ownership conditions.

### **Troubled FKGPs Meeting Described**

*25000598C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
10 Jan 90 p 7*

[Article by Istvan Tanacs: "Party Rift or the Lawyers' Revolt"]

[Text] On 29 December a new party was formed in Szeged: the membership of the NKP [National Smallholders and Bourgeois Party] was recruited from among the former members and officers of the FKGPs [Independent Smallholders Party]. We reported on the new party's goals and officers at the time of its establishment. A few days ago the team that remains in the original FKGPs held a meeting at the cultural home in Kiskundorozsma. In the following article we will try to convey the most important arguments presented at the meeting, and the prevailing mood.

### **Infiltration by Careerists**

The meeting was called to order by Karoly Imre, vice chairman of the FKGPs Csongrad County organization.

"They cheated us. We thought that they called the 29 December meeting to criticize the central leadership. As it turned out, a small group took charge. The organizing committee almost ejected people who did not want to talk to them. The NKP is the party of people who hold doctoral degrees. A majority of the 15 leaders hold doctoral degrees. I won't say it, but it's always the intelligentsia that cause problems among peasants."

FKGP national secretary Pal Dragon

"I asked to be heard. They asked me what I had to say. In the end I took the floor. But wait a minute! Not even the Communists ask someone who wants to speak what he wants to talk about!"

Sandor Olah, KIS UJSAG journalist:

"Defend the party against all malintended disintegration and machinations that serve personal purposes! This is one of the strongest parties: 30,000 members, and a large group of sympathizers. Even though the latter did not dare to join because they still feel Communist reprisals on their skins, they will vote for the FKGPs at the elections."

In the course of further discussion the audience obtained an answer to the question of why the membership in the countryside saw so little of the national leadership's work, despite all the efforts. They said that they experienced great disadvantage as compared to the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. The number of SZDSZ members barely reaches the 8,000 mark, nevertheless they already have 15 party employees; they have office space, an election office, and modern equipment. In addition, the MDF's 20,000 members are served by a growing independent apparatus. Only at the FKGPs do organizers continue to work on a social work basis. In other words, in contrast to the other two opposition parties, the FKGPs has little money: Even from abroad they do not receive as much as the SZDSZ, nor have they received any budgetary support thus far. The reason for this is that the activists who split the party have just now filed a complaint against the FKGPs leadership, stating that it is unable to account for the 3-million-forint budgetary support the party received earlier. A legal audit established the fact that invoices covered all expenses, thus the party was able to obtain another 12 million forints, enough money to hire independent employees able to work for decent salaries in the interest of the party, rather than in the form of social work.

"This nicely evolving organizations was exploded by heretics. This was a lawyers' revolt," according to Csongrad County organization spokesman Zoltan Hatvani. "Many infiltrated the party in order to achieve a political career. They have everything, except the political power."

"And except parliamentary immunity!" someone from the audience shouted.

### **Who Is the Hired Hand of the Communists?**

[Pal Dragon] "I am aware that Dr. Istvan Szegho stated that the election of Dr. Istvan Prepeliczay and Dr. Gyorgy Balogh on the national slate must be prevented so that they do not sit on the party's back for another four years."

[Sandor Olah] "Their accusation reveals their desire: they wanted to eat the chestnuts someone else had roasted, meaning that they wanted to be nominated on

slates. Well, what I'm saying is this: Let the lawyers go to election districts where votes are cast for individuals; let them prove themselves in those districts! They should not distribute positions inside the fortifications of party power, perhaps even the ministerial velvet chairs! Whoever breaks up a party before an election is no democrat, he is a political bandit! The tolerance manifested by developed countries toward the Hungarian economy is finite: The Hungarian people won't receive a penny, and we will drown in debts unless the West sees the evolution of real democracy."

Thereafter the American Hungarian spoke. He was a known Smallholders Party leader prior to his emigration.

"I receive a good pension from out there, I am not afraid. Nevertheless I will say that the Smallholders Party should remain the way it was. At the time we reorganized the Smallholders Party in 1956, I did not see either Istvan Prepelicay or Gyorgy Balogh at Semmelweis Street! Who is attacking the party? Who are they? They are people who have been smuggled in, the hired hands of communists!"

[Zoltan Hatvani] "We want to be the party of the small people. We want to be the party of 10 dekagrams of salami, of those who shop at the Polish market! How could the small people be represented by someone who has tens of millions, who has thousand forint bills in his pocket instead of a white decorative handkerchief, like Dr. Baba? How could he perceive himself in the place of poor people? The one who gathered millions of forints under the communist rule must certainly have some connections with communists!"

Since the other party was not invited to the Dorozsma meeting, I will quote their view from NKP spokesman Dr. Pal Adam's writing in PETOFI NEPE. "Dr. Gyorgy Balogh, the FKGPs managing vice chairman described the FKGPs as a left-wing party; he included the party in the same group as the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] and the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]. Robert Ribanszki, a member of the MSZMP leadership welcomed the left wing of the FKGPs as an ally. Even an assumption of having a party as an ally whose hallmark includes the names of Gyorgy Marosan, Robert Ribanszki, Karoly Grosz, Janos Berecz, and Frigyes Puja was in conflict with my sense of honor and political conviction. For this reason, at the end of last year I submitted my resignation as county managing vice chairman and from all other offices to Antal Kocsenda, the FKGPs Bacs-Kiskun County chairman. He accepted the resignation in consideration of the arguments I presented. At the same time I announced that I no longer intend to be a member of the FKGPs which professes the principle of democratic centralism, and which is of the bolshevik type...."

I must admit that having heard all of these arguments I was unable to decide who the real hired hands of the communists were in the final analysis—the ones who

split from the party, or the ones who stayed in. Could it be that both the FKGPs and the NKP leaders are infiltrated bolshevik agents?

#### Even Then There Will Be No Full Steering Committee Meeting!

A few people rose. They looked like real smallholders. One after another they asked:

"You have been talking here about this and that, but you have stubbornly avoided saying why you don't want to convene a session of the full steering committee. Are they worried perhaps that the present leadership would be dismissed?"

"What good would it do to convene the full steering committee? In the interest of party unity, in Western democracies they do not change the leadership before elections. They will do so if the party does not show results at the elections. But then we will do the same."

"But pardon me, there must be some problem with the national leadership if so many counties changed over to the NKP."

"Those are not members, they are dismissed leaders who issued statements on behalf of the entire county. But I would bet that, for instance, Dr. Pal Adam could not transfer his own organization at Lajosmizse to the new party."

"The trouble is that we do not have our own press. The rest of the parties have infiltrated mass communications; they have their people built in. When are our leaders going to make statements in the radio and television; when are they going to make our program popular?"

"The NKP people say that we do not even have a program."

"Of course we have! This thick book contains the FKGPs program, the trouble is that the county leadership influenced by the party opposition did not forward it to the local organizations."

"But still, the full steering committee should be convened, but only in closed meeting so that the disintegrating effect of the press does not prevail!"

"This election must be won if you want land! We will change the land law once we are in power, and we will give land to the peasantry once again."

Debate consumed a lot of time and the lease on the premises expired. In the end the meeting instructed one of the lawyer members of the FKGPs Csongrad County organization to notify the "lawyers' party" to account for the party assets that were left with them. They announced that the FKGPs would file suit against the NKP on the grounds of unauthorized use of the famous word: "smallholders." Those present adopted a proposal according to which the FKGPs will lease the Hungarian Optical Works [MOM] cultural home on 20 January, the

day the NKP convenes its national full steering committee. They will attest to their program and to party unity at a national grand meeting of smallholders.

### **Forty-Three Parties Registered**

*25000652D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
26 Jan 90 p 6*

[Interviews with Dr. Maria Almasy, Budapest court official, and Dr. Tibor Csiba, chief of the Interior Ministry Elections Office, by Tibor J. Keri: "Party Inventory: There was One, Now There are 43; Registration Deadline Expires at Midnight"; date and place not given]

[Text] In a few hours the official deadline for parties to register will expire. As is commonly known, the party law which took effect on 31 October 1989 states that parties will have three months beginning on the effective date of the law to register while maintaining legal continuity. We asked Dr. Maria Almasy, judicial council chairman at the Budapest Court, how many parties took advantage of this opportunity in Budapest.

[Almasy] We have registered 32 parties thus far in Budapest. These are as follows: The Hungarian Liberal Party (party leader: Dr. Vilmos Meszaros), the Hungarian Socialist Party (Rezso Nyers), the Hungarian Radical Party (Mihaly Rozsa), the Hungarian Liberal People's Party (Sandor Sz. Nagy), the Independent Social Democratic Party (Ferenc Kiczinger), the Hungarian National Party (Dr. Ferenc Bartal), the People of the East—Christian Democratic Party (Frigyes Tamasi), the Social Democratic Party of Gypsies in Hungary (Pal Farkas), the Voks Humana Movement (Janos Sebeok), the Entrepreneurs' Party (Tibor Szabo), the Green Party of Hungary (Gabor Szekely), the Christian Democratic People's Party (Sandor Keresztes), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Jozsef Antall), the Hungarian Freedom Party Alliance (Bela Benedek), the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (Dr. Anna Petrasovits), the Hungarian Independence Party (Tibor Hornyak), the Catholic People's Party (Dr. Endre Varga), the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (Gyula Thurmer), the Social Democratic Party (Imre Takacs), the Freedom Party (Dr. Gyula Gueth), the Hungarian People's Party (Janos Marton), the Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party (Vince Voros), the Patriotic Election Coalition, the Justice Party of New Hungarians, the Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, the Homeland Party, the Republic National Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats (Ferenc Koszeg), the Sacred Crown Society (Dr. Miklos Kallay), the Hungarian October Party (Dr. Gyorgy Krasso), the Agrarian Alliance (Tamas Nagy), and the Hungarian Legitimist Party (Laszlo Palos).

[NEPSZABADSAG] What other parties have valid applications pending?

[Almasy] At present there are 14 more applications pending for the following organizations: the Ferenc Munnich Society, the Party of Generations, the Hungarian Health Party, the Hungarian Industrial Unity Party, the Association of Pensioners, the Association to Protect

Nature and Society, the Small Pensioners' Party, the Alliance of the Poor and the Dependent, the Alliance of Christian Democrats, the Association of Christian Democratic Youth, and the Association of Young Democrats.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Have there been any parties or organizations whose registrations the court refused?

[Almasy] Four cases have been rejected. A party tried to independently register three of its district basic organizations. There is no need for that, because the court regards a party as an independent legal entity, rather than the basic organizations.

[NEPSZABADSAG] And the fourth?

[Almasy] The Hungarian National Christian Democratic Workers Party. They are the ones who did not provide the required supplemental information to this date, and therefore they were not registered.

\* \* \*

[NEPSZABADSAG] Can a party or movement which did not register its organization run in the elections, and can it run candidates?

[Csiba] Under no circumstances could they run in the elections as parties. They may not nominate independent candidates either; they may only support independent candidates.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, based on the letter of the law the "phantom parties" on the street cannot run in the elections.

[Csiba] Not as parties, according to the law. The law provides that they must apply for registration.

### **Provisions for Free TV Campaign Ad Time Described**

*25000652C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
6 Feb 90 p 4*

[Interview with Gyorgy Balo, chief of Hungarian Television elections office, by "F. R.": "Who Pays the Bill?"; date and place not given]

[Text] We reported the fact that the Hungarian Television had established an elections office. We asked Gyorgy Balo, the head of that office, about his tasks:

[Balo] As is commonly known, out of the 40 parties certain to be running in the elections only four parties are represented in the government appointed curatorship which oversees television. At the same time, in the course of inter-party conciliatory negotiations some strong proposals involving the election campaign were forwarded to the curatorship. The interested parties also include those not represented in the curatorship, and whose existential right has been questioned. As a result of this a decision was reached somewhere, but I do not know where, that each party should be given 10 minutes of broadcast time by Hungarian Television to introduce themselves to viewers.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How many parties are at issue?

[Balo] The figures are completely haphazard because they change from day to day. Today we are talking about 43 parties. But this already means that in the course of four weeks and two days we must broadcast that many programs, and that adds up to one every two hours.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How did the office come about?

[Balo] This issue has been raised before, but then, due to the known general circumstances, the idea faded away until last week when we were requested in very strong terms to try to provide for this programming. Someone, or some people, made a promise to the parties that in the name of democracy and equal opportunity every party would have a voice on radio and on television, up to two times five minutes, even though we cannot find a legal basis for this in the election law.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Who pays the bill?

[Balo] Hungarian Television and Radio.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How will the parties get on the screen?

[Balo] In response to a call issued by the inter-party conciliation committee, all interested parties were supposed to register by last Saturday. On Sunday they held a lottery drawing to determine the sequence in which the various parties will appear on the screen. This took place in the presence of a notary public. One matter is certain with regard to the sequence: Each party will be allotted a time segment at 2005 hours on HIRADO, and another in the course of the main program scheduled for that time on TV-1.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You are the head of this office, but neither you nor the Television accept responsibility for anything. How does this come about?

[Balo] There was a huge debate about what can go into these programs. Well, the TV and I personally do not accept any kind of legal or editorial responsibility for these programs. The parties may say whatever they want. Our job is to serve them at the given time under the given circumstances in the most honorable manner, pursuant to the best of our professional knowledge. Incidentally, in order to avoid subsequent arguments and attacks, the recordings will take place in the presence of a notary public.

### Social Democrats Explain Party-Trade Union Controversy

25000650A Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
31 Jan 90 p 5

[MTI report: "The MSZDP on Cooperation With Trade Unions"]

[Text] On Tuesday Gabor Szilagyi, member of the national Social Democratic Party [SZDP] leadership, discussed with MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] the relationship between the Social Democratic Party of

Hungary [MSZDP] and the trade unions. He pointed out that certain expressions contained in the MTI report concerning the party steering committee's Saturday meeting were quoted out of context, and were thus misinterpreted, as was pointed out in several branch trade union statements issued Monday.

Szilagyi said that at Saturday's steering committee meeting Party Chairman Anna Petrasovits did not make a statement, but responded to questions raised by a few party members. In several places in the country, workers brought up the issue that the ongoing discussions between the SZDP and branch trade unions, which are consistent with the statement of intent issued by the MSZDP, may suggest to some that the SZDP has entered into an unhandeded pact with the trade unions, and that in this way the SZDP tacitly supports trade union leaders left over from the neo-Stalinist era to salvage themselves. This was the matter to which the party chairman reacted by saying that "Social Democrats have entered into a pact not with the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT], but with branch trade unions," using the term 'pact' in its original meaning (agreement, compact).

Speaking of branch trade unions, Szilagyi explained that in the SZDP's judgment some positive processes have begun to evolve during the past months and weeks. In the course of their internal renewal, branch trade unions definitely became and are becoming more independent from the party-state and from the economic oligarchies. Consultative work relationships were established and continue between several trade unions and the SZDP as a function of this process, and the outcome of such discussions was summarized in joint statements issued by the SZDP and individual branch trade unions. Social Democratic Party activists negotiated and continue to negotiate with trade union officials who take seriously the place and role of unions within a trade, in a democracy that functions normally.

According to the member of the SZDP leadership, the social democratization of trade unions does not mean more or less than it means elsewhere in Europe. That is, trade unions primarily provide representation for the economic and social interests of workers and employees, while social democratic parties give voice to their political interests in parliaments. At the same time, Szilagyi stressed that he regards as undesirable the continued political activities of certain trade union leaders who have thus far been unable to effectively represent the economic and social interests of wage earners and salaried persons.

Szilagyi served a reminder of the fact that in its statement of intent the SZDP had made it clear that the MSZDP recognizes the autonomy of trade unions and their important societal missions, and that "trade union action unity may be maintained even under pluralistic conditions within the trade union movement." He confirmed his party's intent to cooperate with trade unions in the course of parliamentary elections, in due recognition of common interests. The SZDP continues to regard

organized workers as its comrades-in-arms in the course of building a social democracy, Szilagyi stressed.

**MDF Issues Official Statement on Csurka Affair**

*25000650D Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
30 Jan 90 p 5*

[National Press Service report]

[Text] Statement by the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]:

Relative to the unwarranted debate conducted by the press with regard to the Csurka note broadcast in the VASARNAPI UJSAG radio program:

1. The national presidium of the MDF once again establishes the fact that it intends to continue to fight against the remnants of Communist Party dictatorship consistently, and in every field of endeavor.
2. The presidium deems it desirable that the style of every manifestation of the organization be at a high level, consistent with the requirements established by the direction in which our political culture is developing.
3. The presidium not only delimits itself in an unmistakable manner from all anti-Semitic manifestations, it is also prepared to take the firmest possible stand against all incitement in this relation, whether open or veiled, and at the same time against groundless slander invoking anti-Semitism.

## HUNGARY

### Soviet Troop Reductions Conditioned by NATO Balance, Parity

25000586D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
29 Dec 89 p 2

[Unattributed article: "New Units To Depart Next Year; Colonel General Burlakov on Soviet Troop Withdrawals"]

[Text] On Thursday the head of the Soviet Southern command, Colonel General Matvei Burlakov issued a statement to MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] concerning the present status of troop removals and the 1990 schedule. The Soviet government assigned Burlakov to deal with the affairs of the Soviet Army stationed in Hungary.

Consistent with the most recent Soviet governmental decision published by both the Hungarian and the Soviet press, additional Soviet military units will be withdrawn in 1990 from the territory of the Hungarian Republic. Troops to be removed from Hungary include an air force regiment, a rifle regiment, two tank battalions, and other units. Soviet forces stationed in Hungary will be reduced by more than 6,000 soldiers, more than 40 airplanes, 120 tanks, about 180 armored vehicles, and more than 400 motor vehicles, according to Burlakov.

Burlakov stressed that this decision of the Soviet government will result in troop reductions in addition to unilateral troop withdrawals announced earlier. In reaching this decision the request of the people of Debrecen that the nearby Soviet air force unit be removed because it is too close to inhabited areas was taken into consideration. This unit will also be withdrawn from Hungary next year. Further Soviet troop reductions are part of implementing the new Soviet military defense doctrine, and part of the realization of principles concerning rational and satisfactory defense.

As part of the unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces and arms, based on the Soviet government's decision in 1989, an entire tank division, a tank training regiment, a fighter airplane regiment, and several other units were withdrawn from Hungary. More than 10,000 soldiers, 470 tanks, more than 200 artillery units and grenade launchers, and more than 3,000 motor vehicles and other military vehicles departed from Hungary to the Soviet Union. This decision projected the withdrawal of additional units in 1990. The number of personnel involved may be estimated at 2,000.

Based on all of the above, by the end of 1990 the strength of the Soviet troops stationed in the territory of Hungary will have been reduced by more than 30 units, and about 18,000 soldiers will have departed from Hungary.

The announced troop withdrawal is progressing according to plans. As a result of this, Soviet units departing this year transferred to the Hungarians barracks, training bases, and a large number of residential buildings. Soviet units have been withdrawn from the Hungarian-Austrian border zone, thus establishing the so-called "zone of confidence." The vicinity of Budapest also became more quiet; the populace in Budapest's Southern districts are no longer disturbed by the air force unit at Tokol. The fighter airplane regiment stationed there before has been withdrawn. As before, present Soviet troop withdrawals are taking place in the open and in public.

The pace at which Soviet troop reductions take place, and how and when withdrawals will take place are within the jurisdiction of Warsaw Pact member countries. All of this, however, is closely tied to the all-European armament reduction and disarmament process, and with the situation and progress of the Vienna arms reduction negotiations. The unified force of NATO's Southern wing enjoys substantially superior power. For this reason additional troop reductions must be based on thorough consideration. Further troop reductions are conditioned by the fact that they must take place in a balanced manner and based on parity, according to Burlakov.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA****Agricultural Changes Discussed by Forecasting Institute**

*90EC0244C Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jan 90 pp 6-7*

[Interview with Eng Kveta Burianova, candidate of sciences, and Doc Eng Jaroslav Vostatek, candidate of sciences, both of the Forecasting Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, by Ludek Motejlek and Eng Martin Marik: "We Are Embarking Upon an Untrodden Path"; place and date not given]

[Text] [ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] In the beginning, we should tell each other how our agriculture can be characterized, what kind of a place it occupies in our entire national economy.

[Burianova] Every branch has its specifics as does agriculture and I do not mean this from the biological standpoint. Among other factors, I refer to the fact that each sector was approached with a different kind of hardness, with a different degree of preference, and, to a considerable degree, with different economic instruments. It is often said of agriculture that it belongs among the stabilizing branches within the framework of our economy and, in comparison with the other branches, is advanced. This is justified by the fact that our markets have sufficient foodstuffs across the board, that we are self-sufficient in the production of foods of our types. Much less is already said about the price at which we have achieved this. The fact that, like energy, agriculture was accorded preferential treatment was reflected in the utilization of a range of economic stimuli. The overall strategy of agricultural production was governed by the slogan calling for the provision of adequate foodstuffs for our citizens from our own resources, which was expressed in the same terms of self-sufficiency. The reason was the fear among the power elite that, should the people not have anything to eat, the entire system would disintegrate. However, no one was interested in finding out the actual cost of producing foods in this country; the yardstick was the volume of production, much the same as was the case in, for example, metallurgy. After all, according to one concept, we were to be producing 1 ton of grain per inhabitant by the year 2010.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] So the result is that agriculture is producing expensive foodstuffs which are then subsidized by the state in order to preserve their retail prices....

[Burianova] So that we understand each other—expensive foodstuffs are not produced by agriculture, but by our entire economy. If the words about efficiency and quality are empty and not supported by economic stimuli, as long as the entire philosophy of economic thinking is erroneous, agricultural workers are not to blame for expensive foodstuffs in much the same manner as, say, furniture manufacturers are not to blame

for a shortage of high-quality furniture. No matter what people do, very little will be reflected in an inadequately functioning economic mechanism. And if we produce for the sake of production, then such an effort will even appear to have negative effects. Now, we will be concerned with ridding agriculture of the glorification accompanying a well-developing economic sector and taking care not to go to the other extreme—as if agriculture was responsible for expensively produced foodstuffs. When the horn of plenty was opened for them and farmers were compelled to adopt the philosophy of producing for the sake of production, they had no alternative but to embark upon this path. Now, we shall be concerned with categorizing agriculture into a unified system of economic rules applicable to the entire economy. The agricultural reforms must reflect the overall economic reforms.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] You spoke of the philosophy of producing for the sake of production. We would like to begin with this point in order to respond to the question as to why we are producing expensive foods.

[Burianova] What is involved here is that we are achieving higher agricultural production by increasing production consumption and not by better utilization of production resources. Technological changes, development of new capacities without improving technical levels, do not signify greater economic efficiency. For example, we can take the raising of cattle which is of key importance to the economy and economization of agriculture. There exist two contradictory strategies regarding the raising of cattle, with one based on the renewal of proper care on the part of the farmer for animals and for the soil. The second in its extreme concept is based primarily on the balance of carbon in the soil, does not consider current costs or the possibility of reducing them, and determines its cattle herds from the need to fertilize the soil.

Of course, it is natural that even these technological connections have their significance, but given the current level of cattle breeding they are not as great as is being contended. Fundamental shortcomings exist in the nutrition and care of cattle—we feed them sour fodder and spoiled hay, the ratio between the ingestion of proteins and energy is in imbalance, feed dosages are frequently changed, mastitis follows poor hygiene, etc. To this situation, let us add that the per-hectare yield from permanent pastures is 47 percent lower than that in the countries of the European Economic Community, that fodder plants contain much roughage, and that we need grain to even maintain a low degree of utility. In 1986, we required 230 grams of fodder grain to produce 1 liter of milk (the Swiss required 150 grams)—and in this country we produced 3,750 liters of milk per cow annually, compared to 5,000 to 6,000 liters. What is more, high dosages of grain are physiologically counterproductive, they cause metabolic problems and not even penicillin prolongs the life of milk cows on average to more than three periods of lactation. In other words, we require more grain without this factor being reflected in

the resulting market production; therefore, we have a typical example of production for the sake of production.

We see a way out of this endless loop in the accelerated regeneration of the care provided by a real farmer for the livestock and for its pasture, which today does not mean any kind of return to small-scale production, but rather the opposite—it means moving from today's accumulated small-scale production to true large-scale production which would improve animal care and which would involve a substantially smaller number of employees and, in part, fewer basic assets. This process could be accelerated by a variation of developments involving meat consumption, which would anticipate the temporary decline in meat consumption. Apart from propagandizing rational livestock alimentation, this development must be helped by a price policy aimed at setting retail meat prices in accordance with the level of domestic costs as well as the possibilities for meat imports. This pricing policy would result in a relative increase in the price of beef and milk and would reduce the prices of pork. This should also be accompanied by a saturation of the market with consumer goods which will, in turn, lead to reducing the pressure on the consumption of foodstuffs.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] You speak of the possible importation of meat—this completely contradicts the theory, which was stated and followed for years regarding the need for us to be self-sufficient as far as the production of foodstuffs and basic agricultural raw materials is concerned. And this was the theory upon which our entire agricultural production was based.

[Burianova] This strategic goal was proclaimed at the time world prices of energy were rising and when economic development in Czechoslovakia was deteriorating. Our domestic economic mechanism was inefficient and so we joined the countries who were unable to afford inexpensive foodstuffs in the world market. This occasioned that sudden call for self-sufficiency, caused by the fears of those in power that people might not have anything to put in their mouths. Claims of the extraordinary strategic significance of grain crops were also found to be suitable. And so Czechoslovakia now joins three other CEMA countries which have more or less assured the smooth supply of their populations with foodstuffs. In order for us to achieve this, it was not possible to take into account the wage and material costs; agriculture was given the green light, irrespective of the cost.

Even if this situation is untenable for the future, many people feel that self-sufficiency continues to be an unchanged credo. Analyses tending to document the average costs in comparison with the rest of the world have the same goal. And, at that, no economy can shut itself off from the world, nor can its branches which are capable of competition and where the growth of imports and exports is essential. It will no longer be the function of foreign trade to import "essential" products and to export products without major consideration of prices. With the aid of the new economic mechanism, the anti-import barrier which renders the importation of

advantageously priced products impossible will be overcome, irrespective of whether it involves foodstuffs, energy, or electrotechnical equipment, etc. At the same time, possibilities for exporting agricultural products must be opened up—of course, they involve the willingness of the foreign customer to cover our full national economic costs. However, in this country, the situation is that, in view of the loss of the previous standing in the world market involving our traditional export commodities such as sugar, hops, malt, beer, which were caused primarily by the obsolescence of technical-economic parameters, it is meat and dairy products which occupy the leading position in our export activities involving this sector of the economy today. These are products which our agriculture produces at the greatest cost and marketing these exports in nonsocialist countries for the most part covers not quite one-fourth of our national economic costs while marketing these products to socialist countries covers a maximum of 40 percent of these costs. This represents more than Kcs 9 billion of annual decline in the national income. If our foreign trade is to become efficient, it must be subordinated to the costs involved in the individual products. Which again brings us to the immediate need to render our agricultural production more efficient.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] This then brings us to the merits of the matter. What is the real picture regarding the expenditures which society makes for the production of foodstuffs?

[Burianova] Agriculture is receiving relatively high subsidies in various forms in our country as well as abroad. In this country, wide publicity was accorded to views that our agriculture receives fewer subsidies than the agriculture of Western Europe. However, we must take into account that some special regimes in value relationships are still in effect in this country—regimes which indicate a specific difference between listed and actual "full" subsidies. Consequently, it is very important to ascertain or to estimate the actual magnitude of domestic costs of social production in the area of agriculture.

Some specialists selected the method of calculating individual and other economic instruments in terms of individual agricultural products. They reached the conclusion that agricultural production in our country is subsidized to the extent of 23.9 percent of the overall payments made for plant production and 21 percent for livestock production. However, this method also has its stumbling blocks. On the one hand, it operates on the hypothesis that taxation renders the appropriate products artificially more costly. However, we believe that even activities financed by the state budget are included in national or full national economic costs of production. Moreover, the above-mentioned method fails to take intersectoral relationships into account. At that, the existing pricing system was deeply distorted and, in terms of agriculture, this was felt with extraordinary sharpness until recently. Another reason is the high volume of subsidies of all types and the previously low taxation of manpower and profits in this sector.

If we take this fact into account, then the results of the calculations are indices which indicate a rise in full national economic costs over and above the bulk-buying and wholesale prices. These then indicate that our agricultural production, on a national scale, is running about 60 percent more than the value placed on it by bulk-buying prices from 1985. At that, the relationship between national economic costs and bulk-buying prices was and is expressly different with respect to individual products. It is more than two-thirds higher with respect to table grapes, tobacco, rye, flax, and sugar beets; it is highest in terms of animal products and slaughter calves (198 percent), as well as with respect to slaughter cattle and milk. The lowest values are those of wheat and barley (32 and 33 percent, respectively), slaughter poultry (28 percent), eggs, and slaughter hogs. By increasing the bulk-buying prices as of 1 January 1989, this level approached the level of the national economic costs.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Surely, foreign and world prices of products will play a constantly growing role in helping to determine agricultural price policy.

[Burianova] Certainly. By comparison, for example, we determined that in the mid-1980's, Czechoslovak bulk-buying prices for plant products were 2 to 3 percent lower than producer costs in the FRG and our national economic expenditures for plant production were approximately 40 percent greater. Substantially worse results exist in the comparison of livestock production. Overall, it is possible then to estimate the level of our full national economic expenditures at 180 percent of comparable expenditures on the part of producers in the FRG.

This is an average for all of agriculture. It can be said that we are in a more favorable relative situation with respect to wheat and barley, as well as with respect to sugar beets and rye. Extremely high costs, however, are recorded for hops, potatoes, slaughter cattle, milk, and poultry, and we are producing slaughter hogs, corn, and sugar beets at very high cost. In order for these production costs to be adequately comparable, we took FRG taxes and subsidies into account. We do not want to guess here about a deviation of a few percent points more or less, even if it were, say, only 150 percent of West German costs, qualitatively nothing changes with regard to these facts.

**Retail Prices and Full National Economic Costs in Czechoslovakia and Producer Costs in the FRG  
(per kilogram or in percent)**

Item	Retail Prices 1985, Czechoslovakia (Kcs)	National Economic Prices, Czechoslovakia (Kcs)	Consumer Prices 1985, FRG (DM)	Retail Prices/ Consumer Prices (Kcs/DM)	Index, Czechoslovakia, National Economic Prices/Retail Prices (in percent)
Beef					
Hindquarter	46.0		17.83	2.58	
Forequarter	22.0		10.26	2.14	
<b>Total</b>	<b>81.60</b>				<b>240</b>
Pork					
Roast	46.0		11.82	3.89	
Side	20.0		8.0	2.50	
<b>Total</b>	<b>34.90</b>				<b>121</b>
Chicken	30.0	49.40	5.33	5.63	165
Milk (1 liter) (3.5-percent butterfat)	3.10 (5.0)	7.80 —	— (1.22)	2.54 (4.10)	252 —
Eidam cheese	23.0	68.50	12.03	1.91	298
Eggs, E quality (10 each)	13.0	15.70	2.64	4.92	121
Butter	40.0	109.0	9.44	4.24	272
Potatoes	2.50	3.90	0.88	2.84	156
Bread	2.60	4.30	3.04	0.86	165
Granulated sugar	7.30	8.80	1.94	3.76	121
Flour	4.20	4.70	1.36	3.09	112
Coffee	240.0	—	24.20	9.92	—

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] The above facts most certainly would change the views frequently expressed by our leading representatives, namely, that our agriculture can proudly match that of the most advanced nations of the world. Now, however, we want to match them with

deeds rather than with words. In this regard, an unpleasant but necessary form involves mutual comparison—naturally without rose-colored glasses. How are we doing with respect to other indicators in comparison with the FRG?

[Burianova] The question of wages is interesting. In West German agriculture, with more than three times more expensive manpower, they are achieving virtually one-half of the overall costs per unit of production. Here, great opportunities involving conditions of a beginning economic reform are outlining themselves for us also.

In addition to valuing manpower, there is frequent talk of the prices of other agricultural inputs—fodder, energy, fertilizer, and machinery. Overall, by comparing costs involved in the purchase of fodder, fertilizer, energy, and tractors (we restricted ourselves to these for the lack of sufficient documentation regarding other machinery), we conclude that our agriculture is operating with inputs which are at the price or expenditure level of developed capitalist nations, or even substantially cheaper (fertilizers and tractors). Certainly, to the extent to which our "supplier" branches would work without deficiencies, the expenditures for agricultural production would be substantially lower. Of course, arguments based on the dynamics of agricultural input prices do not conflict with our conclusions, since agricultural product prices generally grew more rapidly than input prices. In summary, it is possible to state that high national economic expenditures for Czechoslovak agricultural products are brought about exclusively by the reproduction process in our agriculture and by the overall concept of the existing system for the management of the entire economy.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] For the present, we have only touched upon the relationship between the production of foodstuffs and the market. What is this relationship and what should it be?

[Burianova] For the time being, we cannot even speak of a foodstuffs market, at least not in the true sense of the word when we speak of full-blooded market relationships. The fundamental requirement and goal of the market reform is the full functional development of the market. In other words, a sufficiency of all foodstuffs at the required quality level and within the required time, available at appropriate prices. In this regard, the starting situation in our country is substantially better than that in the majority of the CEMA countries which are compelled to solve problems involving the overall sufficiency of foodstuffs. However, this is not the reason for our satisfaction. The new qualities in our foodstuffs market can be attained only by making a transition to a market system within the agricultural-foodstuffs complex and in the economy as a whole. There is also the close connection with a structural policy, including the restructuring of the entire consumer market. This will have an influence upon the foodstuffs market—specifically on the substantial decline in its importance when the share of food in the overall consumer expenditures is reduced. At the same time, we anticipate a growth in expenditures for the purchase of industrial products and services. If the economic reforms are implemented without unnecessary delays, it can be expected that the consumption of some foodstuffs will decline, not only relatively, but also in absolute terms temporarily. This consumption is substantially greater in this country than would be commensurate with the overall standard of living.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] In other words, do you believe that, for example, improved supplies of consumer electronics products on the market will contribute to our eating less and eating more healthily?

[Burianova] Certainly, surely if the market were richer in other merchandise and services, a significant portion of the citizenry would not be throwing money away on food and would not be overeating as much. Moreover, this is not only a matter of the volume of consumed foods, but also involves a change in the structure of human nutrition. An essential factor in this regard is particularly the production and consumption of animal proteins compared to plant proteins. To produce a unit of animal protein, it is necessary to consume a high degree of plant proteins which is reflected in our great expenditures for meat production. It is obvious that even the mere changing of the structure in human nutrition would represent a fundamental release of material, labor, and natural resources and would result in a significant improvement in the standard of living. Let us remind you of the indisputable fact that the quality of nutrition has an undeniable effect upon health. In other words, not only nutritional, but also health aspects speak in favor of a relatively higher consumption of foodstuffs of plant origin. Let us recall that leading world specialists in nutrition and oncology anticipate that at least 40 percent of detected neoplasms have their causes precisely in nutrition.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] For this reason, it will be all the more suitable to influence our habits precisely through the medium of their marketplace. However, how is it in reality with retail prices in this country in comparison with the rest of the world? Is food in this country truly inexpensive?

[Burianova] What frequently happens is that subsidies are used to maintain food prices at low levels. But we have already stated that subsidies are aimed at agriculture where foodstuffs are produced at a high cost. By comparing retail prices in the entire sphere of retail trade, and paid services for the populace with prices in the FRG, we determined that, in this country, food is from 10 to 20 percent more expensive. At that, in West Germany, foodstuffs are 45 percent more expensive than, for example, in the United States. By comparisons with the other developed countries, we found that food in this country is as expensive as, say, it is in Japan and there, prices are the highest of all developed countries. In other words, this means that food prices would not have to be raised, but that the ratios between their prices must be changed. This can be accomplished by changing the turnover tax in such a way that, in the foreseeable future, it could be around zero for all types of foods, excluding alcoholic beverages and cigarettes. Hitherto, the effects of state taxing policy in this regard were expressly negative. Pricing policy with regard to food over the past decade did not contribute to the rationalization of popular nutrition, but tended to have the opposite effect. The realization of a program for the rationalization of the turnover tax will, for example, lead to the elimination of the price advantages of pork loins over lean pork. From the expenditure standpoint, relative price increases for beef over pork will have a relatively positive influence. Vegetables will be relatively cheaper.

**Excess of Full National Economic Expenditures Over Wholesale Prices and Bulk-Buying Prices (Selected Input Price Indices From the Price Structural Model)**

Item	Price Excess
Agriculture	1.605
Plant production	1.468
Livestock production	1.739
Foods	1.413
Milling products	1.364
Malting products	1.237
Sugar mill products	1.292
Potato products and starch products	1.220
Edible fats and plant oils	1.166
Slaughter and meat products	1.508
Eggs and egg products	1.556
Dairy products	1.551
Fruit and vegetable products	1.562
Bakery products	1.363
Nonalcoholic beverages	1.172
Brewery products	1.252
Wines	1.185
Spirits	1.083
Tobacco products	1.020
Industrial fodders	1.283

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] For the present, in other words, we have engaged more in evaluating existing economic mechanisms and their functions. However, if we wish to have a prosperous agriculture producing inexpensive food and capable of competing on the world market, we need a recipe as to how to achieve that.

[Burianova] Of course, a simple and conflict-free recipe does not exist because the path upon which we are embarking has not been trodden by anyone before. Nevertheless, we can propose fundamental principles. Some have already been mentioned in the preceding portions of our discussion, for example, when we spoke of subsidies, taxes on turnover, but also internal reserves in cattle-raising. A substantial lowering of full national economic expenditures will result primarily from the very market conversion of agriculture and its restructuring. As before, a substantial role would be played by the dynamics of efficiency inherent in the economic mechanism of the whole economy as well as the individual sectors. We recommend the central determination of prices for basic agricultural products with a flexible proclamation of new bulk-buying prices for each year. Also, an important role will be played by competition between a large number of enterprises producing comparable products. We also figure on the private sector playing a role.

**Export Sales and Full National Economic Expenditures in Czechoslovakia in 1985 (in Kcs/t and in percent)**

Item	Producer Prices	National Economic Costs	FOB Prices for Noncapitalist Countries	FOB Prices	FOB Prices/National Economic Prices for Noncapitalist Countries (in percent)	FOB Prices/National Economic Prices for Socialist Countries (in percent)
Beef	41,405	79,917	14,090	—	12	—
Pork	24,081	31,009	11,790	—	26	—
Chicken	28,730	45,485	14,420	—	22	—
Eggs	19,188	22,720	6,786	—	21	—
Dairy products	23,631	36,155	8,823	6,826	17	17
Butter	62,400	99,109	14,000	—	10	—
Eidam cheese	39,840	62,300	17,621	—	20	—
Sugar	6,430	8,862	2,254	—	18	—
Hops	71,600	117,731	66,049	61,176	39	46
Malt	3,960	5,109	2,861	2,239	39	39
Bottled beer (per hectoliter)	340	426	551	—	90	—

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] And what about the much-proclaimed material incentives?

[Burianova] Material incentives and personal initiative will be of fundamental significance with the creation of permanent interests on the part of cooperative managements and managements of state enterprises in terms of

profitability, including the support of the efficiency of investments which are closely tied with ownership problems and political reforms. In these agricultural enterprises, it will be possible to do away with wage regulation and to reward each employee according to the quantity of work performed on the basis of nationally applicable wage tariffs and according to their specification in the

collective agreements at the enterprise level as early as possible. An important prerequisite is the establishment of a balanced status in the entire economy, including manpower, and the equalization of wage and other enterprise costs.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] The various forms of subsidies need still to be mentioned....

[Burianova] We recommend their gradual substantial restriction, including the discontinuation of differential surcharges. Specific procedures will naturally depend upon a multiplicity of other factors such as, for example, on the developments in the world agrarian market—world prices are generally below the level of average costs of the principal producers today—on the development of foreign exchange rates, and last but not least, even on the overall domestic pricing policy, including that in the area of retail food prices.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Thank you for this interview.

**Editorial note:** During the period this interview was authorized, Docent J. Vostatek was no longer an employee of the Forecasting Institute, but, on 1 January 1990, he became the general secretary of the Economic Council of the Government of Czechoslovakia. The interview, thus, acquired importance, but not a binding nature. We would therefore welcome comments and remarks, polemic views, and proposals for other possibilities as to how agriculture can contribute to improving the economic situation in our country and be truly a stabilizing element for further economic development. We consider this interview to be one of the articles which is supposed to help make the transition from general proclamations to specific proposals.

#### **Proposed Program of CSSR Agricultural Academy Published**

90EC0244A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech  
19 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Eng Vaclav Davidek, candidate of sciences, corresponding member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Sciences; Eng Zbynek Jech, candidate of sciences, Research Institute for Plant Production in Prague; Eng Vladimir Jenicek, doctor of sciences, Agriculture and Food Economics Research Institute in Prague; Eng Miroslav Spelina, candidate of sciences, member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Health Technology Research Institute in Prague; Eng Vaclav Valenta, candidate of sciences, corresponding member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Sciences, UVTIZ; and Eng Josef Parik UVTIZ: "The Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Sciences on the Road to Democracy—Proposed Developmental Program"]

[Text] Hope in the existence of a democratic, free, and humanistic Czechoslovakia is more realistic than ever. In order for this to come about and be permanent, the

aforementioned principles must be applied in all spheres of human activity, in every institution, in each of us. We see these problems in a particularly urgent manner with respect to the relationship with scientific research activities in the agricultural-foodstuffs complex and in its institutionalized representation—the Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Sciences [CSAZ].

It is not possible to be content with any kind of halfway solutions with respect to its mission, structure, activities, and, primarily, with respect to any practical results.

We believe that the qualitative transformation of the CSAZ must be fundamental and clear. We have in mind not only the complete and irreversible elimination of one-party monopoly in management and in membership, including the arrogation of a one-sided method of decisionmaking on fundamental questions of agricultural-foodstuffs science and research, but also substantial changes in organization, in the style of work, and in the quality of management. The indicated changes must be implemented with courage, immediately and in a comprehensive manner, not hesitantly and without consistency.

Apart from the essential internal personnel changes, we consider it to be particularly urgent to quickly process the CSAZ's Development Program—a program which would completely solve the reported problems in its functioning and work content, membership base, and internal organization, the qualifications of its managers and its decisionmaking process, and, primarily, the program direction of scientific research activity and its connection with practice.

As a fundamental qualitative criterion of CSAZ activities and in the interest of its permanent existence, there must be a clear prosecution of results of its work for the needs of Czechoslovak agriculture and the foodstuffs industry which will, in turn, lead to real authority on the part of this institution. Consequently, it will be necessary to increase its commitment in the realization of results based on its amended and expanded activities.

The capability of the CSAZ must be demonstrated in the immediate future in so as to make it possible to provide an impetus for the rational and effective development of science and research along with qualitatively new economic conditions and requirements, with the goal of substantially increasing the efficiency of production of trouble-free foodstuffs in a democratic Czechoslovakia.

The working group of agricultural specialists, therefore, submits to CSAZ members, to scientific researchers, and to broad agricultural specialists the following proposals for a new direction in CSAZ activities and operational methods for consideration.

#### **Membership Base**

Membership in the CSAZ shall be open to all citizens of the CSSR who are leading representatives of science, without regard to their political convictions, religious

affiliation, or nationality; membership is also open to specialists from practical areas who have achieved results having key significance for the development of appropriate industries. Membership in the CSAZ is also open to important representatives of science and practice from other countries.

Of course, it is necessary to rebuild the membership base of the CSAZ. The current CSAZ membership base was chosen when the CPCZ had a legally guaranteed leading role in society. Among other things, this resulted in a negligible number of nonparty CSAZ members.

In this regard, it is necessary to accomplish the following:

- To propose that leading specialists in agricultural, foodstuffs, and forestry science, practice, and other institutions (transfer facilities, managing components, etc.) having high moral qualities, as well as significant scientific and practical results, become CSAZ members;
- To fully rehabilitate former members who were compelled for political reasons to leave the ranks of the former academy in the period following 1968; this includes those who were even compelled to leave in the period following 1948 (even if they had not already been proposed for CSAZ membership).

The composition of the CSAZ membership must guarantee both its scientific level and also its capability to transfer the results of scientific work to practical utilization in the appropriate areas. It is recommended that, in doing so, the present practice of according regular membership, honorary membership, corresponding membership, and foreign membership be retained and that these categories not have their overall numbers increased over and above the current status.

In this regard—in view of the political situation which resulted from the illegal 1968 military incursion of five Warsaw Pact member states—honorary CSAZ membership should be proposed for those specialists who, as a result of political and employment discrimination introduced after this incursion, were unable to continue in their scientific work and retain their civic honor.

#### **Forms of Work**

The fundamental question which must soon be solved here is the connection between the CSAZ and scientific researchers of the individual industries. In so doing, it is necessary to assume that the current arrangement and management of scientific research is completely unsatisfactory, leads to the wasting of state resources, and subjects the activities of scientific research to justified criticism, particularly with regard to its low degree of efficiency. The fragmented nature of scientific research into various jurisdictional and economic spheres, ranging from the budgetary to the cost-accounting sphere, does not create the climate necessary for concentrated research work and tends to exclude the necessary degree of coordination. Current conditions in a number of instances directly favor duplication or multiplicity in

research which, in terms of its results, means not only the squandering of the capacities of scientific workers, but also of state resources (a number of research institutes are established as mirror images in the CSR and the SSR).

This indicates that high-level organs do not fulfill their coordination duties and, in a number of instances, cannot do so because they are incapable of judging the level and the needs of the proposed research activity.

This function can only be fulfilled by an organ of highly erudite specialists who should renovate the CSAZ. Only the academy, in its simplified internal structures, could judge proposed research solutions, compare them with the status of research on a worldwide basis, and, with sensitivity, coordinate these activities through leading organizations engaged in research and development within the scientific research community. The tasks and jurisdictions of leading research and development organizations must be reformulated. Consequently, the following are primary necessities:

- A. All state resources made available for agricultural, foodstuffs, and forestry research and development should be concentrated in the CSAZ and should be used to cover the expenditures of research and development selected by it;
- B. Research and development organization should be changed, with the following two variations offering themselves as solutions:

**Variation 1:** Concentrate leading individual research and development organizations (informatics, economics, plant production, livestock production, mechanization, biotechnology...) under CSAZ guidance and through the CSAZ, coordinate a solution of research and developmental tasks at other research institutes of appropriate branches and sectors within the agricultural-foodstuffs complex.

**Variation 2:** Concentrate all appropriate industry research institutes under CSAZ direction, verify their justifiability in accordance with economic and other criteria, utilize the distribution of state resources and use the leading research and development organizations to coordinate research and development. It is estimated that, in comparison with the status which existed in 1986 through 1990, it will then be realistic to lower the demand for noninvestment capital for research by as much as 30 percent.

Even if state resources are reduced, research institutes would not have to reduce their capacity as long as they could assure themselves of other sources of financing. State resources should be used only to cover the expenses of such tasks of the state program and projects which are primarily basic and cross-sectional in character. Tasks of a technological character should be covered in part from contributions and payments made by state enterprises which have ordered them or from the profits of activities resulting from the introduced systems, etc. This would

mean making it possible for research institutes to sell the results of research and development and to thus acquire resources for the development of these institutes. Selected research and developmental tasks should be assigned on a competitive basis with the possibility of international competition, or appropriate organizations should be provided with a state purchase order. At the same time, the assignment of tasks should be specifically simplified (the required parameters for results should be determined, as should the timing and method of control pertaining to the progress of the solution and the submission of results, the magnitude of allocated resources for the solution, and the assignment of the responsible solver). The coordinator of the program, project, or task should be entrusted with conducting ongoing controls of the progress and level of the solution and should be granted jurisdiction to halt the solution of the task or a part of the task in the event that the prerequisites for a successful solution are not present.

The transfer of results of research into practice should be solved, on the one hand, through the direct activities of parts of the capacities of some institutes, and on the other hand, through existing enterprises which, in return for a fee, will acquire the results of the solution (they might even participate in the solution or might even order it) and which will transfer the results into practice, for example, through processing management systems for individual production areas, by providing plans directly for individual enterprises for a fee, or by introducing a system of management and cultivation pertaining to appropriate plants. It is also anticipated that new enterprises of the transfer type will be created on the basis of self-financing.

CSAZ structure (its specialized and other organizations, commissions, etc.) should be determined in relationship to the arrangement of the scientific research community. Its organization should be simplified, the content of work should be reevaluated, as should the need for various commissions. In any event, however, it should retain its function as a leading research site in which prognostic work would be synthesized for the appropriate sectors and economic control centers of the State and in which measures for the direction and coordination of research in Czechoslovakia, measures for the education of specialists, and other important questions would be proposed.

In addition to a base of permanent employees, this work site should have specialized teams composed of temporarily assigned leading scientists from individual institutes for the solution of important problems of a cross-sectional character. It would be desirable to create such conditions for participation in these teams that the employees themselves, as well as their institutes, would consider an invitation into such a team as the highest reward (forms of bonuses, being dispatched abroad on temporary assignment, along with participation in the work of the team).

The program for the development of the CSAZ will be discussed and, following possible amendments, will be

approved by the expanded plenary session of CSAZ members scheduled for 23 January 1990. We propose that two to four specialists, who are not members of the CPCZ, be delegated to attend these proceedings by Civic Forum, by research institutes, and by other organizations.

**CSR Agricultural Minister on Grain Crop Problems**  
*90EC0244B Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech*  
*19 Jan 90 p 7*

[Interview with Eng Jan Vodehnal, candidate of sciences, minister of agriculture and alimentation of the Czech Socialist Republic, by Eng H. Hanzlova: "Question Marks Surrounding Grain"; place and date not given]

[Text] For this year, only a single indicator of the state plan remains in effect for agricultural enterprises—namely, the grain purchase plan. However, it is precisely in this connection that a number of unified agricultural cooperatives and state farms are experiencing many complications and have hitherto unclarified questions. We received answers to some of them from Eng Jan Vodehnal, candidate of sciences, minister of agriculture and alimentation of the CSR [Czech Socialist Republic].

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Despite the fact that last year's grain crop is spoken of as the third highest in history in our agricultural industry, a number of JZD's and state farms have not fully covered their requirements for fodder grain for livestock production. How is this unfavorable situation being solved?

[Vodehnal] It is estimated that, in the CSR, there is a shortage of approximately 1 million tons of fodder grain prior to the next harvest, even though last year's grain harvest was truly high and exceeded the original plan targets by 3.8 percent. Upon the request of our ministry, the Government of Czechoslovakia released 600,000 tons of grain from the federal reserves to cover this shortfall, grain which is already now at the disposal of the cattle feeding industry. We anticipate that agricultural enterprises will acquire even additional missing quantities of grains, however, they will have to pay a surcharge of 680 korunas [Kcs] per ton over and above the basic price.

Effective in 1991, we want to make a consistent transition toward the market mechanism in managing the grain inventory. Consequently, agricultural enterprises should create favorable conditions for the utilization of domestic animals as early as this year's spring planting period.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] From the national economic standpoint, it is necessary for malt to retain its important place among the exports of our food industry products. Of course, this is dependent on an adequate volume of raw materials—on malting barley. Will the interest of agricultural enterprises in cultivating this considerably risky spring grain crop be supported this year?

[Vodehnal] Currently, we are discussing the introduction of a new surcharge on the purchase price of malting barley in the third quality category and the return sale of fodder grains. Specifically, growers should be able to obtain approximately Kcs 200 more than they did last year per ton of malting barley of the stated quality and, moreover, depending on the quality category, should be able to acquire 0.35 to 0.5 ton of fodder grain for every ton of malting barley. A definite plus for agricultural enterprises is also the fact that for every ton of malting barley the breweries and malt factories will provide them with 0.5 ton of brewery grain, beginning this year. It is also not negligible that the Agricultural Supply and Purchasing Concern, for the first time, is guaranteeing its contractual partners a supply of effective pesticides against fungal diseases for the entire area planted to malting barley.

The public will certainly be interested in the fact that, currently, the Czechoslovak State Standard for malting barley is being revised. The goal is to adjust the values of those indicators which do not exert a negative influence on the technological process in malting factories and which are frequently the causes for a failure to categorize certain shipments of grain as being of malting quality.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Among the main factors as to why we are attaining lower per-hectare yields of grain crops than is the case in some developed European countries is the noncomprehensive utilization of intensification factors, in addition to climatic influences. This is influenced, among others, by the unsatisfactory level of equipment. What types of changes for the better are being anticipated?

[Vodehnal] For spring planting of grain crops, agricultural enterprises are being offered 840 new seed drills. Of this overall number, 310 will be of the most desirable type for accurate drilling—Pneusej, Amazone, Becker, and Multicorn. In conjunction with the necessity to limit losses of grain in the field, this year harvesting combines will be utilized which have been designed for use on slopes. Of the overall number of 600 new combines, 140 will be of this type, which continue to be in short supply. Also, the sale of high-quality application equipment for plant protection will be increased so that the availability of 150 new sprayers is anticipated for this season.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Leading researchers and practitioners agree that a shortage of effective chemical preparations rob us of a significant portion of the grain crop each year. Do the prerequisites exist that we will prevent this situation this year?

[Vodehnal] It is true that grain farmers in the CSR paid the price last year for a shortage of fungicides valued at approximately Kcs 43 million foreign exchange by a decline in the harvest yield of approximately 300,000 tons. Another approximately 270,000 tons were lost because the necessary insecticides were not available to

combat a calamitous outbreak of green fly. Other losses occurred as a result of weed infestation of crops and the incidence of other diseases and pests. We are aware of the fact that we must utilize all opportunities for strengthening the allocated financial resources to import pesticides, particularly from nonsocialist countries and to utilize them on a priority basis to protect grain crops against fungal diseases. This is not a simple matter because there is a shortfall of some Kcs 200 million in foreign exchange to cover the standardized requirements of all pesticides for individual crops, after the impact of the current devaluation. Problems also exist with respect to the import of some types of pesticides from Hungary which is demanding payment for them in hard currency.

We do have certain good reports from last fall when 525,000 hectares of winter wheat were treated with special herbicides, or 180,000 hectares more than the previous year [1988]. To facilitate this increase, foreign trade transactions valued at Kcs 28 million in foreign exchange were realized. We wish to continue in this direction even this year when we anticipate that the overwhelming majority of the hitherto missing foreign exchange will be acquired by exporting agricultural and foodstuffs products. However, problems persist with the so-called ace of chemical preparations being sold for high prices which is something criticized by farmers. Therefore, we are seeking other forms of reimbursement which might be more acceptable to purchasers.

Compared to last year, the domestic production situation with respect to, for example, deliveries of Metation for protection against green fly will improve; but not to the extent that the entire demand for this preparation would be fully covered. Thus, we will continue negotiating with domestic producers of this and other pesticides. We have in mind that, insofar as the application of chemical nutrients and protective agents to plants is concerned, we must assume the responsibility that this will not contaminate the environment.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] The existing policy line was aimed at self-sufficiency in grain crops. Will we consistently adhere to it even in the future?

[Vodehnal] We consider one of the principal tasks in the immediate future to be the development of international cooperation on an enterprise scale. We are already creating the necessary organizational and economic conditions toward this end now. To the extent to which this intention will actually be consistently realized, we need not then insist so much on self-sufficiency and this would be the case not only for grain crops. We can advantageously replace the missing sources of food for the smooth supply of our market elsewhere in the world.

[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY] Thank you for this interview.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### FRG Auto Makers Prepare To Enter GDR Market

#### Problems Noted

90EN0289Z Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 30 Jan 90 p 26

[Article by Andreas Oldag: "On a Rocky Road to the GDR"]

[Text] Munich, 28 Jan—The West German auto industry is in the starting blocks, ready to develop the market in the GDR. Of prime importance is the establishment of a service and dealership network. But plans are also being hammered out in board rooms for manufacturing there. To be sure, skepticism still prevails at Bavarian Motor Works (BMW) AG. The general legal business conditions are not yet adequate. BMW Board Chairman Eberhard von Kuenheim advises against putting money into sick VEB (East German state) enterprises.

Louis R. Hughes is regarded as a man of quick decisions. Thus, as far as the chairman of the board of Adam Opel Corporation AG, Ruesselsheim, was concerned, there was no question that the development of the GDR market would be directed by the General Motors (GM) subsidiary and not by the European headquarters of the American company in Zurich.

#### Mountains of Applications

A small crew from Ruesselsheim has recently been combing the GDR. From Rostock to Dresden and from Weimar to Erfurt, Opel experts have been testing the opportunities for setting up a dealership and service network. "We are encountering great interest primarily on the part of small automobile repair operations. Many want to work for Opel. We are getting mountains of applications sent to our office. Even the descendants of Opel dealers from before the war who were expropriated after 1945 are being heard from," says Peter Preikschat, director of dealership development at Opel.

The German GM subsidiary intends to establish a service network of 40 workshops in the GDR by the end of the year. In addition, there will be the establishment of a central spare parts depot which is already being negotiated. The service workshops, which are primarily intended to serve Opel drivers arriving from the Federal Republic, are only the beginning, however. Thinking is already under way in regard to sales locations, even though most GDR citizens are likely not to have the money for a Western automobile for some time.

#### Antiquated Telephone Network

The German auto industry is standing in the starting blocks, ready to develop the GDR market. While for years it was essentially only permitted to exhibit its high-tech products at the booths of the Leipzig Trade

Fair, the opportunity now presents itself for a large-scale offensive, and the establishment of manufacturing installations are being talked about in this regard. Old historical connections are being reactivated: BMW once manufactured in Eisenach, Audi had its origins in Saxony, and the legendary Opel-Blitz truck was produced near Brandenburg.

Volkswagen AG (VW), Wolfsburg, with its billion-mark investment plan for building a successor model to the Trabant as well as founding a joint company with the VEB IFA (Industrial Association of Nationalized Motor Vehicle Works) Combine, Passenger Car Division, Karl Marx Stadt, has undoubtedly outstripped its competition for the present.

Neither Opel nor Ford nor Daimler-Benz have any sizable signed agreements with the GDR motor vehicle industry to show thus far. Above all, skepticism still prevails in regard to the issue of possible manufacturing in the GDR. No wonder, since the GDR as a location, despite its advantages—low wages and at the same time a pool of qualified skilled workers—still appears to be a problematic market. The infrastructure has remained frozen at the level of the 1950's. The road network has deteriorated and rail transport takes days. In addition, the telephone network is hopelessly antiquated. There are hardly any EDP (electronic data processing) links, which are the absolutely essential prerequisites for operating in a modern production context with just-in-time deliveries.

Despite the liberalization of the joint venture regulations that have now been announced by GDR Economics Minister Christa Luft, the general legal conditions of business do not yet appear adequate for the West German automobile manufacturers. BMW Board Chairman Eberhard von Kuenheim: "By no means will we lend our good name to minority participation projects. Furthermore, we are not putting our money into sick VEB enterprises."

#### Gift From the West

GDR citizens lack the necessary buying power to stimulate sales. The few new Western cars cruising the East German roads to date have been delivered via Genex, the state gift service, and paid for with hard foreign exchange currency—a privilege for only a few. To be sure, for commitments in the GDR the West German auto industry is considering paying a portion of wages in Deutsche marks. At present, however, the legal premises are lacking. BMW boss Von Kuenheim, with an implied reference to his colleague Carl H. Hahn, chairman of the board of Volkswagen AG, is skeptical in this regard as well: "A grand vision is not called for. We must feel our way towards the GDR market with small steps."

VW boss Hahn can already show quite a measure of overall success as a result of the cooperation with the IFA Combine he has been engaged in for years. In the course of a barter deal involving the delivery of installations and equipment for the licensed production of engines,

the first skeleton engines are now being delivered in turn from the GDR to Wolfsburg. All the same, the engine production apparently still has to struggle against the restrictions of a planned economy. "That begins at the very outset with power interruptions," says a specialist in the field. To be sure, a VW spokesman views this differently: "We have long since overcome the initial problems."

Not least of all because of the great start-up problems is BMW treading very gingerly on the accelerator pedal for the time being. Thus, according to Von Kuenheim, the procurement of tools from the GDR is being considered as a beginning. The Munich people want to open five additional service locations in the GDR in the near future. To date, there have only been two of them (East Berlin and Dresden/Bautzen). These centers can then serve as starting points for a more dense service network, for which BMW, in a like manner to Opel, wants to approach independent handicraft businesses. The personnel is to be trained in Munich.

#### **Lada No Longer in Demand**

To be sure, Von Kuenheim's reserve must also be seen against a very different background: In contrast to mass-producer VW, BMW is specialized in the high-priced segment of the business. An automobile of the 3d series costing DM30,000, let alone a DM100,000 7th series car, will probably remain a dream for a potential GDR customer for a long time yet. The same applies to Mercedes-Benz passenger cars. At least until recently, they were taboo: Eastern managers did not favor the West German "capitalist's car," but rather drove a Lada—and the GDR government leadership preferably a Volvo. A company spokesman in Stuttgart predicts: "A certain negative image can change rapidly now, of course. A socially just market economy in the GDR—our products are right in line with the trend in that regard." But Mercedes-Benz is still not harboring any great sales expectations.

#### **Different Story With Trucks**

The situation looks different for the Stuttgart people in the area of commercial vehicles: The company has recently been holding talks with the VEB IFA Combine, Utility Vehicle Division, Ludwigsfelde, regarding possible cooperative ventures. The people in Stuttgart have been selling trucks to the GDR for years—at least 300 heavy trucks in 1989.

#### **VW Chairman on Joint Venture**

90EN0289X Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 29 Jan 90 p 22

[Interview with Carl H. Hahn, chairman of the managing board of Volkswagen AG, by Franz Thoma: "An Investment of Billions for 250,000 Cars Per Year"; date and place not given; first paragraph is SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG introduction]

[Text] Wolfsburg, 27 Jan—Volkswagen AG, Wolfsburg, will establish a joint undertaking with VEB IFA Combine, Passenger Car Division, Karl Marx Stadt. The timing is dependent upon political decisions in the GDR. An all-new car is to be developed. In an interview with the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (SZ), Carl H. Hahn, chairman of VW's managing board, put the desired volume of production at 250,000 cars per year. Research and development alone may cost more than DM1 billion. The text of the interview follows.

[SZ] Mr. Hahn, you are just back from East Berlin from your talks with GDR Minister for Economics Christa Luft. Now when are you going to begin your planned joint venture with VEB IFA, Passenger Car Division?

[Hahn] A prediction as to a timeframe is not possible. It depends upon the GDR's political decisions. What we can do, is to test the basic plan and its soundness together with IFA.

[SZ] Is the new, coproduced auto—probably a subcompact—being designed for Eastern countries or for the entire world market?

[Hahn] We are not categorizing it in terms of East and West but very simply according to the criterion that the car must be competitive internationally—on the world market. There will no longer be two standards.

[SZ] An investment of around DM1 billion is needed before an automobile is ready for series production...

[Hahn] At least.

#### **Credit From the Entire West**

[SZ] You will certainly be able to come up with your half. How will your partner come up with his?

[Hahn] We will leave that up to our partner. Those are things that will be considered in the coming weeks during the planning sessions in the DR. Moreover, we believe that the GDR will not only receive credits from the Federal Republic, but from the entire Western world. But it must pursue an economic policy that makes it attractive to foreign capital. Only in that way can the GDR rapidly catch up—and it must do so. The GDR does not have Deutsche marks by the billions in its accounts for new and necessary projects. With our help, and on the basis of the industriousness of its people and the resources still available, it can only reorganize its infrastructure and formulate reasonable plans on that basis. You will understand that I am not going to say anything about details. We are in the process of researching all that like a completely normal project. We have formed a team for that purpose—on our side as well on the GDR side. It is already working.

[SZ] Is not the general limitation of 49-percent Western participation an obstacle for Western investments?

[Hahn] It would certainly remain an obstacle if an inhibited attitude, which derived from past ideological

thinking, were to be retained towards the subject of ownership in general. We believe, however, that we should not lose much time at all over this matter today. After the elections on 6 May [Editor's note: now scheduled for 18 March] these questions must be answered. And if they want to have a better economy in the GDR—more competitive and more profitable for the people—then the GDR must be more attractive to capital. The capital must come to the people. We see in this a development which will be irresistible. It will proceed towards the normalization of ownership as the central element of a functioning market economy.

[SZ] As VW, would you be satisfied with 49 percent?

[Hahn] We regard this question to be so theoretical at the moment that we cannot answer it at all.

[SZ] You will have to build a new plant for the new automobile.

[Hahn] We have to take the sites in Eisenach, Zwickau, Karl Marx Stadt, and Zschopau into consideration because we cannot relocate the people. There is infrastructure at these sites, and it is partially usable. We just cannot afford to duplicate it.

[SZ] We think that a new plant in this area...

[Hahn] It is not just a matter of a plant, rather it is much more a matter of outlying areas that need plants. Accordingly, what is involved is not a plant for Zwickau, but a project for all of the combine's sites.

#### Build on Existing Resources

[SZ] But can enough capacity be freed up in the existing plants?

[Hahn] No, of course not. But there is a difference whether I remodel and expand existing resources or whether I build everything from scratch. Naturally, we will try to save the most possible from the past. Additional study on our part will show to what extent that will be possible—we have already done the initial research, of course.

[SZ] What figure for capital expenditures for the conversion of a plant or plants came out of these initial investigations?

[Hahn] We do not yet have the precise answer to that.

[SZ] There is talk of DM4 billion.

[Hahn] All right, good—those are all just numbers. You have to first see how they were arrived at. I would not like to add more numbers here. Everyone knows, however, that in the automobile industry amounts of this magnitude are the initial investment required to be internationally competitive.

[SZ] How do you envision the supply situation? A just-in-time system such as we have will hardly be possible in the GDR at the moment.

[Hahn] On the contrary—because we have gotten and still get supply shipments from the GDR. We have a head start of 5 to 6 years in this area, and we will of course use it. We are already cooperating with GDR enterprises today. Every day 500 engines are delivered to us from Karl Marx Stadt.

[SZ] VW had previously shipped the equipment over there for this project.

[Hahn] The equipment was from VW. But an IFA factory in Karl Marx Stadt is building 500 engines for us a day. There is, therefore, a whole lot of things that can be used.

[SZ] To what extent can your partner and you prepare yourselves now for the joint venture? There are already joint management courses, are there not?

[Hahn] Yes. We happen to have close contacts—and not just since 9 November, but for many years now.

[SZ] What unit production volumes do you have in mind for the new car?

[Hahn] A volume which is competitive. And if you are speaking about unit volumes, you have to start with a minimum of 1,000 vehicles per day.

[SZ] That means about 250,000 cars per year.

[Hahn] Yes, but on the other hand if you keep in mind that we want to help the GDR raise its living standard, create more normal working conditions for its people, and thereby achieve better productivity, then new automobile production capacity must be created for the East in general. That must go hand-in-hand with modernization of the infrastructure and work in the areas of housing, road construction, power production, environmental protection, and everything related. That is an awfully lot at one time. That is why predictions about timeframes are very difficult.

[SZ] Do you not believe in general that the GDR and the Federal Republic will merge economically more rapidly than they will politically?

[Hahn] Yes. The economy will be the driving wedge because people—thanks to freedom of movement—cannot be prevented from proceeding pragmatically.

[SZ] A question outside of the realm of the strictly objective: Your father virtually founded the Auto Union in 1932 by the amalgamation of DKW (Zschopau Steam Cars), Wanderer, Horch, and Audi.

[Hahn] He was one of the cofounders, yes.

[SZ] Returning now to Saxony as an automobile manufacturer, what do you feel?

[Hahn] These feelings that everyone has today in Germany in regard to this political development are, for someone who has these kinds of roots, naturally infinitely more varied, deeper, and more heartfelt than

anyone could ever imagine. On the other hand, of course, one has to view with sadness the great but futile efforts which these not less industrious people have been making for 40 years and which have taken them in the wrong direction.

## HUNGARY

### 1990 State Budget: Insecure Foundations Analyzed

*25000608D Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
18 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by Maria Zita Petschnig: "After Adopting the Budget: Time To Catch One's Breath"]

[Text] Following a long, tormented debate, representatives adopted the 1990 state budget. They did so with the vote of a substantial majority. It was known that preservation of the country's solvency was at stake. In mid December loss of solvency had become a real and proximate danger. In the absence of reaching a new credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund [IMF]—expected to take place in mid January provided that appropriate conditions are established—it appeared as certain that the economy would collapse prior to the new parliamentary elections. The imminent threat of economic collapse was averted as a result of the 1990 budget approval. But how will things evolve in the future? Can we take advantage of a time period just enough to catch our breaths?

The adoption of an unpopular measure which has an impact on the populace was not a matter representatives were enthusiastic about. Even though the proposal submitted to the National Assembly included compromises already. Thus, for example the International Monetary Fund [IMF] originally requested a 10 billion forint additional reduction in subsidies, and the balance of payments improvement recommended by the IMF would have involved a budget surplus. Incidentally, this would have been a realistic expectation had the three year stabilization and evolutionary program approved by the National Assembly in the fall of 1987 been implemented. That program called for no balance of payments and no budgetary deficits by the year 1990. But where are the promises of a year, of two years or even three years ago?

At present the Hungarian political situation is as complicated as possible. By setting aside the political alternatives which quite naturally also influence the economy, this article presents a sketch of the main trends likely to evolve on the basis of the budget just adopted, and in due regard to the conduct manifested by those influencing economic processes.

#### Tax and Subsidy Reductions

This is the first state budget in a long time to be written while observing the principle that expenditures must be adjusted to revenues. Representatives have reached a decision on taxes, except for consumption taxes. They did so

aware of anticipated expenditures. The deficit level was restricted by an agreement reached with the IMF.

As a result of changes in tax laws, profit centralization will be reduced by three percent among enterprises that pay dividends, and by 14 percent in the case of state enterprises. Will this kind of improvement in the position of entrepreneurs suffice for the achievement of greater performance? Not in my view, and not primarily because the rate of tax reduction is too small, as many thought it would be. Namely, in the eyes of entrepreneurs the tax rate is only one, albeit important, factor. The entrepreneur's frame of mind which thinks in the long term, his awareness of the evolution of excises over time is more important than the momentary size of a tax. Tax reductions produce larger income, and thus also larger tax revenues, if the market, production, and infrastructural conditions for the expansion of entrepreneurship are given; if the tax rate can be calculated also in the long term; and if the larger income that stays with the enterprises is well spent. The latter assumes the existence of real owners and the prevalence of an interest in the appreciation of assets.

In Hungary an improvement in the ability to produce income is not hindered by a bottleneck produced by the tax rate. Incidentally, one cannot rule out that budgetary revenues will increase despite the decrease in centralization. In all likelihood, however, such increase will be an inflationary incremental income.

This year, as a result of dismantling consumer price supports everything becomes more expensive, ranging from basic consumer goods through services to luxury consumption. Housing rental fees will increase and so will the installment payment obligations of residential mortgage loans. The burden on the budget will be reduced, and low efficiency production will not have to be financed by way of complicated techniques, because the populace, if aware of it, will pay these expenses directly. Viewed from the long term perspective the question of whether the populace survives the planned 20 percent inflation is not an issue. The issue is whether simultaneously with dynamic consumer price increases there will be changes in the economy which slow down the growth of producer costs on the one hand, and whether national consumption will decline by between 2.0 and 2.5 percentage points, which would be needed to acquire an improved external economic position, on the other.

#### Increased Savings Unlikely

Both of these issues point beyond the budgetary sphere. After all, reducing inflationary pressure would require quickly growing market conditions and the earliest possible liquidation of monopolistic positions and of loss operations, as well as visible and credible evidence to the effect that the government has committed itself to pursue an anti-inflationary policy: i.e. entrepreneurs ["recipients of income"] base their business decisions on this, and not on the increased acceleration of inflation.

A few circumstances cast doubt upon the possibility of reducing individual consumption. Thus, for instance the fact that in reality it was impossible to reduce consumption for decades, and that such reduction is unlikely particularly in an election year. Experience shows that endeavors to constrain consumption resulted in a reduced propensity to save, in an increased consumption of self produced goods, and in the spending of excess income in the first, second or third economy. However much it would be desirable to see a rapid increase in voluntary savings by individuals, I do not see a possibility for that for a number of reasons. The proportion of disposable individual income has been on a continuous decline. This may be seen also in a shift in the ratio of income produced as a result of labor, or received as a matter of social policy consideration in favor of disposable income. Under conditions of an accelerating inflation, escape toward goods and convertible foreign exchange which continue to maintain stable values will be characteristic. Although the central bank promises more flexible policies for interest rates, it is apparent that interest rates do not keep in step with the accelerating inflation.

The big question is whether the desired production and product structural change will really start along with a reduction of producer subsidies amounting to 26 billion forints, and along with significant funding allocations for the Employment fund, and the establishment of the Liquidation Fund which hold out the promise for the acceleration of implementing promises of accelerated bankruptcy liquidation. Namely, reduced subsidies may be offset by price increases and by the devaluation of the forint, and short of competition, by a shrinkage which causes lack of production, and subsequent price increases.

Those capable of enforcing their interests will certainly find an opportunity to do so in the new political set up. For the time being one cannot see either a government that would be willing to guide the painful process of structural transformation, or a market which would force this to come about. One can only find counter interests: trade unions and parties which try to find their respective places as well as popularity, and leaders and subordinates who insist on holding on to their jobs and positions.

#### **The Twilight of Unprincipled Bargaining**

During the 1990 fiscal year the reduction of communal consumption continues. This may be regarded as a favorable phenomenon insofar as it means cuts in defense spending and in the funding of the bureaucracy. In other areas however, this may lead to the hard to remedy devastation of the production infrastructure, in the broad sense of that term. It is publicly known that in recent times differences could be discovered in wage increases as those apply to workers in the budgeted institutional network on the one hand, and enterprise workers on the other. Intent on reducing wage parity the budget projects additional wage increases in a number of

infrastructural fields, this, however, permits only the elimination of part of the disadvantages that developed earlier, and in several fields it does not even halt deterioration.

Resounding changes may be expected in financing councils. Beginning in 1990 budgetary resources will be available on a standard, per capita basis. One of the advantages to be produced by this system will be the elimination of some unprincipled bargaining. The other advantage will be that councils will receive state support based on tasks to be performed. Nevertheless, these funds will not be obligated for specific purposes. (For example, 198,000 forints will be paid for the support of a single person receiving child and youth protection benefits, while a theater viewer will receive 230 forints.) The main purpose and proportion of use will be determined by the elected council body. This will be the first time that councils find themselves in a position in which they must indeed represent the interests of voting citizens, and where there will be something at stake in local elections.

The 2 million forints uniformly guaranteed per settlement, and further increments provided on the basis of population size and age groups will provide a fixed income to small settlements which were disadvantaged thus far because of inadequate power to enforce their interests. In such settlements the feeling of security provided by the ability to budget because of the secure prospect of receiving an income may provide an incentive to make individual sacrifices in the interest of accomplishing sensible community purposes.

#### **Monetary Bursting of the Dam?**

Many things are uncertain in the year that has just begun, but one thing is certain: The projection contained in the budget will not be realized as perceived. In a manner similar to last year, there may come about a corrected budget law also in 1990. Namely, the amount of general reserves does not reach the level of one percent of all the expenditures, and on top, most of the expenditures are already predetermined. Even in quiet, predictable times reserves should be at the one or two percent level, let alone in a country at the edge of the abyss just prior to the changing of parliament, the government, and the regime.

If I view the danger zones "only," I see two problem areas which may upset any and all perceptions if they become strained. One of these is our trade subject to settlement in rubles, the other is inflation in Hungary.

For the balance of payments subject to settlement in rubles, the 1990 plan projects a far greater turnaround than in the balance of payments subject to settlement in dollars. The realism of this perception may be questionable however, for two reasons. On the one hand, the projection is based on a presumed 20 percent reduction in socialist exports, and within that a significant decline

in deliveries effected by large, machine industry enterprises. In this case, the bankruptcy of enterprises producing for a single market is obvious. However, until now no one was able to accomplish this, or to agree to this. Imports, and within that Soviet energy and raw material deliveries may cause an even greater concern. The possibility that as a result of a forced halt in Soviet imports we would have to change over to imports payable in dollars during the year cannot be ruled out. This, in turn would cause a rapid increase in dollar indebtedness, in a budgetary deficit and in inflation—if that is possible at all—and yet, this may be the most fortunate situation.

The other chief danger zone is the possibility that consumer prices increase to an extent larger than planned. All the chances for this to happen exist. According to indications received from enterprises there already exists a between 25 and 30 percent inflation in the economy. In a manner similar to wage liberalization, the larger price liberalization came earlier than it would have been possible, in my view. Moreover, for food prices—as a result of transferring pricing authority to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture—the cabbage was entrusted to the goat, which, in the Hungarian way, raises concern that the cabbage will be gone while the goat remains hungry.

Today, as a result of a barely changing behavior manifested by the supply side, and because of unchanged institutional conditions, the barrier that prevents runaway inflation hinges upon a single factor: on stringent monetary policy. It is rather uncertain, however, for how long and in what way the bursting of the monetary dam can be prevented at a time when all interests call for the opening of the banking and budgetary finance channels. The ruble surplus, the devaluation of the forint vis-a-vis convertible foreign exchange and the great inflationary expectation all point in the direction of mounting inflation.

The 1990 state budget is written around an approximately 20 percent inflation rate. For all practical purposes it does not include any reserves. Although an inflation rate higher than 20 percent may produce additional revenues to the state budget in the form of additional taxes, the same inflation rate would also exert a tremendous pressure on the expenditure side. Such pressures would manifest themselves in part [in demands] to increase social welfare provisions and compensations and to adjust wages in institutions provided for by the budget, as well as to increase the operating expenditures of such institutions. Increasing export subsidies and deposit interest rates would become unavoidable which would then result in the increased cost of credit. From the budgetary standpoint this would further increase the housing support expenditures, as well as the deficit and with it the growing indebtedness of the state, and would render more expensive the financing of all this. Essentially, the above mentioned danger zones call attention to a progression in both the external and the internal indebtedness spiral, one that is real and could be accompanied by consequences that cannot be calculated in advance.

It calls attention to the fact that the external confidence gained with the adoption of the budget may easily evaporate.

#### **Cost of Living Index Rather Than Consumer Price Index Urged**

25000591C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
6 Jan 90 p 8

[Article by (Regos): "Three Million People Below the Minimum Subsistence Level?"]

[Text] We asked Otto Pirtyi, director of the Trade Union Theoretical Research Institute, what relationship he sees between the standard of living and the increase in consumer prices, and whether he regards the Central Statistical Office's [KSH] so-called consumer basket calculations as valid.

"The effect of price increases on the standard of living are obvious; one may assume that this year three million people will drop below the minimum subsistence level. The consumer no longer has a safe haven, because all prices are increasing. Consumers are reaching the threshold where they are unable to shift the composition of their consumption in the direction of lower-priced choices, because everything has become expensive compared to actual value. Private households—just as enterprises—switch to consumption on a restricted scale: They are forced to postpone purchases as well as repair and maintenance work; the number and condition, as well as the modernity, of appliances in private households begin to decline. Not for everyone, of course. The average personal income will increase rapidly and this is reflected in statistics as if the rate of increase in income would have reached the rate of price increases. This is true, except for the fact that income in one family will increase by 30 percent, while in another family it will increase by five percent.

"The consumer price index shows only a very small part of the way living costs change. The official price index does not include increased interest rates or newly introduced taxes, or, for example, the fact that water and sewage fees that increased by multiples will have to be paid by persons residing in rental apartments controlled by the councils. Similarly, the fact that forint devaluations render foreign travel and purchases abroad more expensive, is not included."

"Statistics do not convey hidden price increases either. Statistics do not sense that the contribution made by the population increases continuously—the share paid by the population for the construction of public utilities, for the installation of telephones, for education, for health care, for residential repair and exchange. The methods of computation used by the KSH are highly developed and are well-founded from a scientific standpoint, nevertheless they are somewhat obsolete. For this reason, trade unions today urge that they use cost of living indexes rather than consumer price indexes which take into consideration items not reflected in statistics, but which nevertheless have a great impact on families."

**Changes in Wages and Earnings Between 1978 and 1989**

Year	Persons Employed in the People's Economy	
	Average Wages	Average Earnings
1978	3,464	3,687
1979	3,672	3,877
1980	3,892	4,098
1981	4,141	4,364
1982	4,407	4,651
1983	4,617	4,869

1984	5,189	5,476
1985	5,667	5,961
1986	6,093	6,435
1987	6,608	6,987
1988	8,562	8,968
	(6,609)	(6,984)
1989	9,358	9,858
Without Jan-Mar	(7,288)	(7,651)

*Figures in parentheses show amounts after personal income tax*

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### S&T Developments Enhance Women's Employment Status

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WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT in German No 1,  
Jan 90 pp 68-80*

[Article by Dr. Heidrun Radke, research group director, Institute for Sociology and Social Policy, GDR Academy of Sciences: "Scientific-Technological Progress and Women's Personality Development"]

[Text] Society's attractiveness is essentially measured and judged by its ability to join scientific-technological and social progress. In the conditions of the modern development of productive forces, moreover, new issues arise with regard to the status and role of women in these new processes while, in the social consciousness as a whole, equality is increasingly interpreted and discussed as an essential element in social progress. It is, therefore, a general social concern to enable women to participate as equals in scientific-technological innovation and, in the course of this process, open up new spheres of activity for the development of their personalities. In the present and future situation of the development of productive forces, this concern has also become an economic need. Indeed, the issue of the more efficient use of the female labor capacity assumes ever greater importance in view of the fact that at this point more than 90 percent of the employable female population are working, and that we cannot, therefore, expect a further influx of women to bolster our manpower. Actually the GDR's potential of female skills is virtually unequaled by any other country. Working women number 4.7 million and represent 49 percent of the total current labor capacity in the GDR. They are represented in all spheres of the social production and reproduction process. Some 87 percent of all working women have completed professional training; they account for 40 percent of university cadres and 64 percent of technical college cadres. Policy relating to women must, therefore, be immediately concerned with the development of the female personality and its equal cooperation in scientific-technological advances as well as with the equality of opportunity for men and women with regard to their self-determination and the realization of their specific needs and interests in connection with decisive technological innovations.

In socialism, the same social laws govern the personality development of both men and women in the course of scientific-technological advances: There are no fundamental differences between men and women with regard to the place value of material-technical conditions within the determination of the personality, the formation and multiplicity of the social effects of scientific-technological progress or the "key" function of skills in the total interaction of technological advance and the development of the personality. Sex specific differences tend rather to arise in the concrete contexts and levels of

the conditions for personality development related to scientific-technological advances: In the work content and level of demand inherent in the respective employment, in the involvement of the working people in the decisionmaking process related to the introduction of new equipment, in employment appropriate to their abilities, the kind and the standard of working conditions, and so on. The prime causes of these differences are due mainly to the essential differences between men and women with respect to their access to various professions, occupations, and spheres as well as their status and role in the system of the social division of labor involved in the speed-up of scientific-technological progress, and this in turn is a consequence of significant differences in the structure of their personalities as well as their general work and life situation, in other words in the general social differences between men and women.

In the GDR the equality of women in all spheres of social life is by no means uniformly realized. Based on their work, women are economically independent; they are able to freely decide on relationships and children, and they can reconcile work and motherhood. However, this does not make for the social equality of men and women in the meaning of the same "basic qualities" of their work and life situation and, therefore, their opportunities and their objective and subjective potential with regard to the realization of social and individual interests as well as the development of their personalities and self-realization. Instead, the social situation of men and women is characterized by qualitatively different circumstances and opportunities for the all-round development of the personality, arising from

- The different status and role of men and women in the system of the social division of labor and the political system;
- The social function of motherhood as well as the persisting difference in regard to the allocation of responsibility for the family between men and women;
- The tradition and reproduction of sex specific roles, ideas and behavior (in particular with respect to the development of technical interests and abilities).

As well as from the different status, function, and role of men and women in society and the family—all of them still involving social discrimination of women. These social differences cannot be abolished merely by the modernization of the material-technical base. However, scientific-technological progress offers new opportunities for so organizing social processes and new structures of the division of labor as to deliberately and systematically diminish the significant differences between men and women that are due to their specific work—specially with regard to employment appropriate to their abilities, the practice of intellectually challenging and attractive work or professional earnings. This will require fundamental changes in our society's modes of thought and its approach to the organization of these processes.

Against this background of social inequality as well as the existing ratio of social equality and inequality

between man and women in socialism today, we may summarize the current trends of the personality development of women at work in the conditions of scientific-technological progress in the following basic directions especially:

1. Upon their access to scientific and technical professions as well as to key spheres of scientific-technological progress, new areas of personality development open up to women, the range of occupations available to them widens within the total system of the social division of labor, and the development of their personalities in general proceeds with greater sophistication.

Since boys and girls enjoy identical education and guidance with regard to their future occupations, women in the GDR have had access to virtually all mathematics-science and engineering oriented spheres. They have thereby opened up new fields for their personality development. Though regional differences tend to be considerable, we may note three basic trends<sup>1</sup>:

First: Considered from long term aspects, development has been quite consistent with respect to the representation of women in professions/spheres/scientific disciplines oriented to mathematics, the natural sciences and engineering. Women nowadays account for more than 50 percent of all university and college graduates in mathematics and natural science disciplines. The scientific personnel at technical colleges/universities and engineering colleges accounts for almost 40 percent of women. For many years past, about one-third of female school graduates have been trained for technical occupations in material production. The large majority of these women stay in those professions and acquire more skills. Due to the large backlog, the proportion of women qualified to teach engineering sciences at institutions of higher learning is growing faster than in most social science disciplines. Though the percentage of women who have acquired this teaching qualification for technical colleges/universities and engineering colleges is still not satisfactory, it did in fact double in the past 10 years.

Second: Women are increasingly accepted in "key" areas of scientific-technological progress, in particular microelectronics, biotechnology, computer manufacture and use as well as the production preparatory sectors of industry. Women account for almost 50 percent of all those employed in electrical engineering/electronics and for one-third of college and technical school cadres in that sector. The proportion of women employed in the production preparatory sectors of industry (research and development, design, technology, and so on) has risen consistently since 1980 and now amounts to 43 percent. The implementation of the economic policy aimed at the development and manufacture in the GDR of computers and microelectronics as a whole necessarily resulted in the deliberate induction of female workers in these industries and their appropriate education and training. Moreover, women are employed in programming and software production, not only in the actual manufacturing of microelectronics and computers.

Third: A process of differentiation operates within the natural science-technical professions. Women are represented mainly in electronics/chemistry/electronic data processing equipment but show up relatively rarely in the traditional engineering and metal processing industries (machine construction). Considered from this aspect, it appears that skilled work on electronic components as well as on data processing and manufacture now tends to fall under the heading of "female" professions. This differentiation already begins at the time of the development of the respective interests and skills among children and adolescents, and it continues in the subsequent practice of professions with regard to the introduction of new equipment. Girls account for about 50 percent of all members of the 115,000 school study groups. In the sphere of natural sciences and engineering (where girls amount to roughly 40 percent), they are mainly represented in the groups concerned with mathematics and biology/ecology/environment, less so in the groups dealing with physics, model construction, and technical hobbies. In general it may be said that the early encouragement of technical interests among girls is rapidly turning into a major concern with regard to the suitability and the access of women to technical professions and technical education. Unfortunately, the purposeful encouragement of technical abilities and interests among girls still tends to involve a tough struggle with obsolete traditions. Social and family attitudes toward education will have to make the biggest contribution to ending this struggle and to developing the appropriate general climate of opinion.

These and similar discriminatory attitudes continue to affect the access of women to the most modern production facilities. In the case of the introduction of flexible automation processes in various industries,<sup>2</sup> for example, we note that women are normally employed mainly in those industries that already count many women among their workers (chemicals, electrical engineering/electronics). In industries with relatively few female employees, on the other hand, such as machine tool construction, they rarely work with new equipment. In view of the fact that existing significant differences in the status and role of men and women in the system of the social division of labor are increasing in a definitely specific manner as the result of scientific-technological advances—based on the availability of a respective female skill potential, enterprise-regional conditions, traditions, and experiences relating to the use of the female labor capacity for technical innovation processes, we note a certain "trend toward divergence": In the sectors where women have traditionally been underrepresented, introduction of new equipment "eliminates" them almost completely; in sectors with a relatively high proportion of women workers, the opposite happens—women have increasing access to new equipment and, in relation to the proportion of women in the enterprises' total work force (the chemical industry, for instance) are indeed sometimes overrepresented in these automated plants.

Upon entering technical professions, women develop personal qualities that they are not necessarily called upon to exercise in quite the same manner in other occupations. This applies to attitudes, abilities, and behavior strongly affected by function (such as technological discipline, willingness to perform in extreme working conditions and hardships—clean rooms, work on video terminals and so on—or willingness to work shifts) as well as basic personality traits that women need to develop relatively independent of the actual task, in order to hold their own in technically-oriented spheres, traditionally considered "for men only"—such as perseverance, push, and a strong will, so that technical interest and ability may be reflected in the appropriate performance. These and similar personal qualities evolve in a long-term process of personality development, are consolidated by individual experience and, in these industries, represent an indispensable prerequisite for the professional success of women. It is not due to chance that, in relation to the proportion of female college graduates and other industries or organizations, women account for a significant percentage among management cadres in the construction industry or the Chamber of Technology. Moreover, upon entering technical spheres, the professional activities of women undergo a change from predominantly people-related to object-related work and tasks, though this does not lessen the importance of the well-defined social orientation of women. In tandem with technological innovative processes, the challenges to collectivity and the ability to cooperate within and among the collectives in fact tend to increase. Women are thereby offered an opportunity to more clearly develop their specific qualities. At the same time, the "merger" of technical and social work components allows the personality development of women to proceed more abundantly and with greater sophistication.

By reason of these and similar differentiations in the personality development of women, those processes will be strengthened in the use of key technologies also, that already to some extent display greater differences in lifestyles and personality development between women of different educational and professional backgrounds than between men and women. This is due to the basic general social process reflected in the fact that the personality profile of a working woman is largely defined by her qualifications and status in the social reproduction process rather than by her social function as a mother. Sociological studies have revealed that, with respect to the work and life situation, needs, interests, and value structure, differences in qualification tend to be more dominant than gender differences. However, the traditional differences between men and women with regard to the reconciliation of work and family as well as to the satisfaction of the need for self-realization in work and family are not similarly diminished.<sup>3</sup>

Currently, therefore, we may note two opposing trends—the abolition and the reproduction of essential differences in the personality development of men and women. For the abolition of social differences between men and

women now and in future to become the dominant process, scientific-technological progress needs to be deliberately organized with a view to the all-round personality development of women. It will also be necessary to carry out the *uniform* social policy (required for all working people) of reconciliation between work and parenthood with the appropriate variety and flexibility needed for various groups of women. These concerns are already taken into account by the far reaching consideration for the personal interests of these workers made possible and generally applied in the organization of efficient working hour arrangements made in factories upon the introduction of new equipment and the transition to shift work. Unfortunately many instances remain of excessive timidity, thoughtlessness and ignorance about the proper use of these opportunities in the social as well as the individual interest. The labor unions, in particular, have failed to exert their proper influence in this respect. At the same time we must remember that some basic issues are still not settled even in theoretical terms—for example how more differentiated and flexible measures may be necessary and possible for various groups of women in order to reconcile the demands of work and family, so as to guarantee men and women greater equality of opportunity with respect to the realization of the demands on their performance related to technological advances.

2. Changes in the work situation related to scientific-technological progress exert varying effects on the personality development of these women. While it is axiomatic that technological change, properly organized, encourages the personality development of both men and women, it does happen that traditional difference between men and women are carried over and reproduced with respect to the attractiveness of work.

It has become a general sociological perception that technological innovations normally have a favorable effect on the development of the personality at work—provided the organization of these innovations is appropriate. The changes inherent in scientific-technological advances with respect to the ratio between physical and mental effort—involving the definite tendency to greater emphasis on the intellectual-creative nature of work, the general flexibility of and change in the work generally as well as qualitative changes in the dialectic relations between individuality and collectivity—represent a definite and novel challenge to the roundedness of the socialist personality (in the general-sociological interpretation of the total societal relationship between thought and action as well as the versatility, range, and interaction of the various aspects of the personality and its social relations). This basic trend continues upon the application of key technologies. Personality promoting elements clearly arise from the new work situation in the manufacture of microelectronics, the use of robotic equipment, CAD/CAM [computer-assisted design/computer-assisted manufacture] and flexible automation. They are due mainly to the evident reduction in heavy manual labor, the rise in the intellectual standard

needed and the extent of responsibility involved in the work, to better earnings opportunities as well as to a tendency toward the integration of collectives or closer cooperation between collectives of manufacturing and production preparatory departments as well as ancillary processes. They meet the workers' need for intellectual-creative work, for communication, variety, and independence at work as well as their interests for greater material satisfaction. None of this excludes differences in the various elements of the work situation, so that the general personality development proceeds very differently among the various social groups. Following a period of familiarization, men and women basically tend to assess their new jobs as a gain for their own personality development. Of course the kind of reaction to the work situation arising from technical changes largely depends on the individual character and the personality profile of the workers themselves.

For women also, these general basic tendencies mean that—provided the organization is appropriate—progressive changes in science and technology normally result in advances in personality development: Growth of skills and capabilities, greater demands on availability and economic responsibility, easing of physical labor, enrichment of social relations beyond the actual work collective, improvement of work hygiene and larger earnings—all these represent significant basic trends in the change in women's work situations brought about by scientific-technological progress. Extensive further education provides women with the knowledge required to deal with the new equipment as well as with "social" skills: Self-reliance and reliability in ensuring the steady operation of technological systems, the ability to communicate with cooperation partners outside their own work collective and to overcome inhibitions about handling computer equipment. The percentage of women going in for further education with respect to dealing with key technologies (CAD/CAM, computer equipment, microelectronics) tends to exceed that of women participating in adult education generally in the GDR (currently 41 percent).

Improvements in women's work situations do not, though, automatically imply a reduction in the significant social differences between men and women. On the contrary, despite genuine advances for particular women, wide social differences persist in technologically modern industries—differences mainly with regard to the standard of the intellectual challenges involved in the work and the attractiveness of work as a whole. Depending on the status in the system of the social division of labor and on technological innovation processes, these differences affect women in various social groups in different ways:

a) On the one hand we note differences in the intellectual challenge men and women encounter in their work—differences directly attributable to scientific-technical advances and the existing organizational structure of the division of labor. What happens is that new types of

work, involving wide variations with respect to intellectual-creative content, are allocated in different proportions to the social labor capacity of men and women. Consequently, monotonous functions arise in administrative and other sectors with a large concentration of female employees, and so does work involving visual and psychological-nervous hardships, such as data collection and entry for female clerical workers or microscope work for female production workers employed in the manufacture of microprocessors. These and similar one-sided personality developments of women—related to the nature of work, in particular its technology dependent elements—reflect a general tendency according to which the modernization of the material-technical base, while improving the standard of working conditions, always gives rise to new problems of physical and mental hardship for the working person. Their solution not only requires the proper labor scientific organization of the respective jobs and departments, but also fundamentally new ideas on the distribution of socially attractive work within the total social labor capacity. This, in turn, challenges society in the interest of the development of the productive force to relatively define and differentiatedly evaluate social criteria and the effects of technological advances as they affect society as a whole, social groups or individuals.

b) On the other hand, in relation to the available female skill potential in the respective industries and the ensuing traditional approach to the recruitment of male and female workers for new operations on modern equipment, there are some significant differences in the accessibility of the most attractive work for men and women. This is reflected in the phenomenon—characteristic for some industries—that women are usually employed as operators in modern production plants rather than as fitters or dispatchers.<sup>4</sup> The ensuing significant differences in the overall challenge (the skills needed, the intellectual-creative content of the task, individual scope and opportunities for organizing one's own work, and so on) are not limited to elements of the work proper; they also include evident differences in the standard of earnings and need satisfaction in general and, therefore, achieve a far wider social dimension. This relatively universal phenomenon (not necessarily restricted to new technologies) is specially explosive with regard to the use of key technologies, because these very adjustment processes offer particularly favorable opportunities for deliberately removing the existing differences in the attractiveness of work for men and women. Evidently this presumes the reduction of specific differences in the qualifications of men and women in these industries—for the following reason: The predominant qualification required to handle flexible machine systems is that of the skilled worker who has had additional training. Barely 20 percent of the female workers employed in 10 test factories on automated machinery had this kind of qualification. Among male workers we note a wide range of qualifications (skilled worker, skilled worker with additional training, foreman, technical school and college graduate), the skilled worker

qualification is predominant among women. Due to these different personal circumstances, no significant gender specific differences arise in these industries with regard to qualification appropriate employment and its subjective valuation. Male and female workers consider themselves employed in line with their skills; however, this completely blurs the gender specificity of this problem. The latter does not consist only in a clear difference in standards relating to the attractiveness of the job but also in significant differences relating to qualifications. Considering these results of our studies, new light is shed on the popular belief that existing differences in qualification between men and women will cease quite naturally upon the gradual retirement of the older generation of women. It becomes quite evident that the scanner used for the sociological analysis and valuation of qualification structures and largely concerned with professional qualification standards ("basic qualification") and rather less with widely differing additional qualifications, is no longer adequate to deal with this issue in the present and future situations of scientific-technological progress.

The sociological comparison of work situations, referring to various directions (man-woman, before-after, objective change-subjective valuation), reveals the contradictoriness of the current processes of women's personality development in the conditions of scientific-technological progress. Certainly at least two basic tendencies overlap: On the one hand progress in the development of the personality—reflected and valued as such by women themselves; on the other hand the persistence and indeed deepening of gender specific differences in the level of attractiveness of specific jobs and in qualification at a higher level. Objectively present personality gains upon the introduction of the new technology and objectively present significant gender specific differences in the level of the challenge presented by the job reciprocally limit one another (depending on their valuation by the individual concerned). The advance recorded for the personality development of these women as the result of the new work situation is therefore a relative advance, in other words an advance mainly in relation to the starting situation, less so with respect to the long-range goal of the reduction of social differences between men and women. Moreover: Insofar as the long-standing and traditional gender specific distribution of the labor capacity on sectors of the national economy and the social differences between men and women related thereto are to some extent replaced by another type of gender specific social differences, such as ability-appropriate employment in the work process, existing social difference between men and women are reproduced. And yet, this trend contradicts the principles of equality and social justice, according to which scientific-technological and social progress are indivisible with respect to both men and women. The issue of women's personality development in socialism must therefore be tackled with particular urgency in view of the general necessity for types of social organization for

modern technologies to be assigned much higher priorities in enterprise decisionmaking and, with regard to the acceptance of socialism, must be interpreted as a political as well as a social requirement.

3. On the basis of the compatibility of career and family, scientific-technological progress expands the opportunities for self-realization in work and life. In this process women develop to become the subject of their own personality development.

The implementation of equality does not imply formal sameness of the work and life situation and personality of men and women. The aim is equality of opportunity in their personality development or, for both sexes, approximately the same terms and opportunities for education and the use of their abilities as well as for the realization of gender specific interests, needs and value orientations, so that men and women should be able to develop their own personalities. As motherhood is a direct social function of women's personalities, a higher standard of equality is not achieved by the mere abolition of social differences in the professional development of men and women. Satisfying professional and social activity in the conditions of technological progress also needs to be compatible with having a family. That is why the GDR created long and short term social bases (state child care facilities, sociopolitical measures for fathers also as well as extensive opportunities for the advancement of women), so that women may have a career without having to forsake motherhood.

Given this general compatibility of career and family, women acquire an entirely new outlook with regard to their personality development: First of all, a career provides them with economic independence and, therefore, the freedom to decide the orientation of their lives. Second, women obtain greater access to political activism and democratic involvement, relating in particular to the organization of technological innovation processes within the framework of the labor unions; access to management is also easier. Third, having their own earnings, they have more opportunities to satisfy their needs, including the realization of material and intellectual-cultural needs and interests during their leisure hours and in the family. Fourth, relatively independently of the actual job content, their work as such allows them to develop personal qualities (such as self-confidence, rationality in thought and action, intelligence and political understanding), that enable them more consciously and "with better qualifications" to organize their own lives and those of their families. Fifth and last, from the total societal aspect, their work expands the material and economic possibilities for further social advances—shorter working hours, state financial or material support for families, improvements in the standard of services, and so on—thereby opening up new opportunities for personality development and self-realization at work, leisure and inside the family, both for themselves and future generations. Relatively independently of the actual job, women are therefore becoming the subject of social and individual life and

their own personality development. Their social activity has greatly contributed to the speed-up of scientific-technological progress of society, involving present and future gains of leisure for the family (steady reduction in weekly working hours, sociopolitical measures for the husband). All this has enabled women to better realize their needs, interests and value judgements, whether directed to their work or their family.

Given the current situation and requirements of scientific-technological progress and the bases of socialism, new contradictions and problems are arising thereby for the personality development of women: Contradictions between the efficiency, the working conditions and the real scientific-technological performance of women, contradictions between the special features of scientific-technological work and the specific work and life situation of women, and so on. This applies very largely to women in scientific-technological professions and activities, because the achievement of a high performance standard depends on outstanding personal commitment and great concern with career problems even during their time off from work. Examples are women engineers in industrial research or other spheres involving research and development in natural sciences. Sociological studies have shown that few women in these spheres share in the management of their work collectives, and this is reflected in the fact that women hold no more than a one-percent share in the annual state awards of "honored technician of the people" and "honored inventor." This is not really due to the incapacity of these women to achieve top scientific-technological performances but rather to their inadequate opportunities for full and relatively undisturbed concentration on their research task at and off work, that is to the still unresolved basic dilemma for women to be compelled to carry on their social activities at work and in society without being relieved of their duty to shoulder the main responsibility for the family.

In view of the social inequality prevailing in the GDR, the high standard of women's expectations of life in all its complexity and the rising demands on their work performance in the process of extensive intensification and the speed-up of scientific-technological progress, the compatibility of career and family is turning into a "field of tension," full of contradictions. This calls upon the socialist society as well as the women themselves to creatively deal with existing contradictions and newly arising tasks and problems. It is impossible for the GDR to even consider one-sided or alternative solutions (career "or" family), something that is discussed elsewhere, especially in other socialist countries. Due to the fact that equality represents an essential value of progressive societies and forces at the present time, that the work of women is an important prerequisite for universal social progress in society, and that women themselves feel the need for self-realization in the work process (while they do not wish to forego partnership and children), social policy must certainly pursue a solution that allows women to continue having a career as well as

a family and does not involve the one being pursued at the expense of the other. This is possible only if the cost of individual simple and expanded reproduction in the family is radically lowered by social facilities. That, in turn, requires women to work, because the demands on services and retail performance are growing, and so is the need to develop the infrastructure, the rationalization and socialization of the entire sphere of reproduction. At the same time we are thereby coming closer to our goal of a general reduction in working hours—the long-range orientation of our social concepts. This will mean more leisure for men and women. Greater social spending so as to reduce individual spending on reproduction, coupled with the reduction of working hours for everyone, calls for the efficient exploitation of the entire labor capacity. In the specific circumstances of the GDR it is, therefore, not feasible in the—wrongly interpreted—interest of the family to ease professional pressure on women. On the contrary, society must ease the pressure on the family in order to more efficiently utilize the female labor capacity. The capacity-appropriate employment of women, the assignment of challenging scientific-technological tasks, the organization of effective and flexible working schedules in connection with shift work in technological key industries—all these are particularly important. It will therefore be necessary in almost all social spheres to conquer persistent reservations, intolerance, and prejudice.

The development of the social activism of women for the speed-up of scientific-technological progress responds to the social concern that, in the GDR, the main tasks of social development are usually realized with the active cooperation of women, and that the feminist issue itself is resolved in this process. This orientation is based on historic experiences. According to these, genuine equality can be achieved only by the equal participation of women in all of social life. The proper preconditions for this must be systematically expanded and also changed. On the other hand, the pursuit of these social efforts does not exempt women from their own responsibility and activism for the daily reconciliation of career and family demands. In fact, women are challenged to develop specific personal qualities—in particular with respect to a certain standard of scientific-technological performances. Sociological studies, carried on since 1981, among women workers in electrical engineering/electronics, women college and technical school cadres in R&D departments in industry, women students and scientists, reveal very clear connections between specific personal qualities and the uniform management of the daily jog of work and family and the standard of scientific-technological work performance. According to these studies, women who are deeply committed to their careers handle the demands of their families as well as do other women and, if dissatisfied with their own work performance, tend to seek the cause in themselves rather than in the family situation. The research achievements of mothers are no less than those of women without children. Successful women scientists (professors and lecturers) in fact display a certain trend to having large

families. Efficient women are not distinguished from others by foregoing motherhood but by quite specific personal qualities: Extraordinary commitment to and interest in the professional task, strength of will and the ability to handle conflicts, making great demands on themselves and their performance, ambition with respect to the realization of professional and family life plans as well as full agreement with their partners on value orientations. Successful career women do not ever think of the alternative "career or family." Instead they develop purposeful strategies, a design for living, so as to realize great demands in the various life spheres. This process in the development of the individual needs to already begin and be learned in childhood or adolescence, and it includes the entire range of choice of career, choice of partner and the organization of partnership relations as well as the rearing of their own children.

If the social conditions for the compatibility of career and family are the same for everybody, individual value concepts, needs, interests and the qualities required to realize them become the decisive influence for behavior at work and in the family as well as for the results and performances achieved in both these life spheres. This explains a certain trend toward polarization with regard to the family situation of women professors and women in top science jobs (an above average proportion of childless women as well as of mothers of two or more children). If nothing else this confirms (on the one hand) the perception of sociological personality doctrine that great work performances are generally achieved by an active personality type with a generally high standard of life expectations. On the other hand, the more thorough study and characterization of the other personality type needs for the time being to be the objective of further feminist research.

In any new socialism, it will be a basic issue of the further realization of equality and the personality development of women in how far the same rights to their own professional development will be deliberately spelled out and applied to men and women. However, this problem cannot be settled at individual level only; it needs collective and social efforts, especially to the effect that the government must create and deliberately stimulate the appropriate institutions for the observance and implementation of the specific interests of women—

arising from their current social situation and status. The labor unions, women's organizations, and many rank-and-file democratic feminist initiatives in the GDR have a wide field of action also in this respect, and innovative approaches will have to be taken to achieve decisive breakthroughs. In this respect as for all general issues, it holds true that scientific-technological solutions appropriate to socialism are achievable only if the renewal of society as a whole proceeds alongside the modernization of the material-technical base. In this meaning the current transformation of our country must involve a new beginning for women also.

#### Footnotes

1. We must take account of the fact that the proportion of girls among apprentices in technical and other professions is currently stagnating and, in some instances, actually regressive for the benefit of increased access to universities.
2. For its principal statements, including those on social processes involved in the use of flexible automation, this article is based primarily on the utilization of sociological studies, carried out in 1975-87 at the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Sociology at the Academy for Social Sciences at the SED Central Committee.
3. See "On the Status of Women in the Social Work Process in the Organization of the Developed Socialist Society in the GDR," secondary analysis at the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy at the GDR Academy for Sciences, Berlin 1980, unpublished.
4. Gender specific differences in the standard of the intellectual challenge presented by the job upon the introduction of new equipment have been repeatedly noted in GDR feminist research (see collective of authors, "On Specific Aspects of the Professional Development of Women in Areas of Microelectronics," research report at the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy at the GDR Academy for Sciences, Berlin 1988, unpublished; "Social Development of Women—Compatibility of Career and Motherhood—Demographic Processes of Feminist Research—Information and Documentation," Third International Demography Seminar, issued by the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy at the GDR Academy for Sciences, Berlin 1988).

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